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IGNORING INFORMATION QUALITY 
Janet Freilich* 
 
Entry into the patent system is guarded by an examination process to 
screen out applications that impose undue costs on the public without 
commensurate benefit.  To do this, patent examiners rely heavily on various 
pieces of information—both provided by the patent applicant and 
independently discovered by the examiner—to assess whether an application 
should be granted.  This Article shows that there are few mechanisms at the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office for questioning the veracity of this 
information, even though it may be incorrect.  Rather, patent examination 
often assumes that existence of information equals accuracy of information.  
Consequently, examiners may rely on information that is wrong and many 
decisions about patent grant may also be wrong. 
While it is well known that patent examiners make frequent errors, the 
existing scholarship is almost entirely about what this Article terms 
“matching errors” (where examiners do not find information that actually 
exists), when “digging errors” (where examiners find information but the 
information is wrong) may in fact be more common.  Digging errors have 
serious harms:  nuisance suits, decreased incentives for research, and slowed 
technological development.  The matching-digging framework introduced by 
this Article not only reveals new errors, it also makes the case that existing 
policy tools to address examination errors will not prevent or resolve these 
errors.  Existing policy tools require that errors be visible to the public, 
which is currently true for matching errors but is not for digging errors.  
Solutions to digging errors should therefore be information forcing to 
remedy this asymmetry; and this Article includes several recommendations.  
Further, this Article uses the matching-digging framework to 
reconceptualize examination as a system of quasi-registration that defers 
many decisions about patentability to litigation.  Patents should thus not be 
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given a presumption of validity and doctrines of patentability as applied in 
litigation should not mimic their prosecution counterparts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As COVID-19 spread rapidly around the world in March 2020, a 
biotechnology company, bioMerieux, sought regulatory approval for tests to 
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detect the virus.1  Just days later, Fortress Investment Group sued bioMerieux 
for patent infringement and asked for an injunction.2  The case was unusual 
not only because of the bad optics of enjoining a useful test during a 
pandemic3 but also because the patent in suit was originally developed by 
Theranos,4 a company best known for fraudulently claiming the ability to 
make diagnostic tests that functioned with mere microliters of blood.5  
Further, although the patent in suit was based on Theranos’s fraudulent 
technology, it covered bioMerieux’s working diagnostic tests.6  Fortress 
should not have sought to enjoin diagnostic tests during a pandemic—and the 
patent providing the basis for that suit should never have been granted. 
This Article explains why the Theranos patent was granted, and predicts 
the existence of many similarly problematic patents, with a novel theory of 
examination at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).  This Article 
distinguishes between “matching,” the process of seeking information 
relevant to patentability, and “digging,” the process of assessing the 
reliability of that information.  This Article then argues that patent examiners 
do only the former.  Put differently, examiners are good at asking whether a 
particular piece of evidence exists, but they do not ask whether that 
information is true.7 
The process of patent examination, when viewed in light of the distinction 
between matching and digging, is somewhat akin to how courts assess facts 
on motions to dismiss.  Courts search for the presence of factual allegations 
that match each element of a claim.8  Courts generally accept factual 
allegations as true at this stage, in contrast to trial, where litigants argue 
vigorously about the truth of allegations.9  As with motions to dismiss, patent 
examiners search for the presence of facts matching various requirements of 
 




 2. Labrador Diagnostics LLC v. BioFire Diagnostics, LLC, No. 20-cv-348, 2020 WL 
1283393 (D. Del. Mar. 9, 2020). 
 3. The optics do not reflect the full story of the case.  The plaintiff explained that it was 
not aware that bioMerieux was working on a test for COVID-19, and it dismissed the suit 
upon learning of the test. Notice of Dismissal Without Prejudice at 1–2, Labrador Diagnostics, 
2020 WL 1283393 (No. 20-cv-348). 
 4. U.S. Patent No. 8,283,155 (filed Oct. 8, 2009) (issued Oct. 9, 2012). 
 5. E.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Theranos Founder and Former Chief 
Operating Officer Charged in Alleged Wire Fraud Schemes (June 15, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/theranos-founder-and-former-chief-operating-officer-
charged-alleged-wire-fraud-schemes [https://perma.cc/5M3V-GHSU] (“[D]efendants 
claimed the analyzer was able to perform a full range of clinical tests using small blood 
samples drawn from a finger stick.”). 
 6. ’155 Patent col. 8 ll. 17–19 (“Where desired, a sample of 1 to 50 microliters or 1 to 
10 microliters can be used for detecting an analyte using the subject fluidic device.”). 
 7. See infra Part I.C. 
 8. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
 9. See id.  Facts that are truly unlikely—such as “little green men, or the plaintiff’s recent 
trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel”—need not be taken as true. Id. at 696 (Souter, J., 
dissenting).  This too mimics how patent examiners review facts—those that are physically 
impossible, such as perpetual motion machines, will not be taken as true. See infra Part I.C. 
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patentability and then accept those facts as true, without digging further into 
the veracity of the facts. 
The distinction between matching and digging can be seen in how 
examiners assess the utility and novelty requirements of patentability.  
Inventions are only patentable if they are useful.10  To this end, examiners 
must review a patent application to determine if it contains a statement of 
utility.11  This is a matching task:  examiners match the invention to its stated 
utility.  If examiners find such a statement, the PTO instructs them to accept 
it as true, without further assessing its veracity.12  The process of matching, 
but not digging into, the quality of a statement can also be seen in the novelty 
analysis.  Inventions must be novel; they cannot be patented if an operable 
version of the invention has previously been publicly disclosed.13  Examiners 
search the prior literature for a disclosure matching the claimed invention.14  
If examiners find a match, they reject the application.15  The PTO instructs 
examiners to assume that the statement discloses a working invention; 
examiners do not dig into the statement to assess operability.16 
Failure to dig into information quality leads to errors during patent 
examination.  Examiners make decisions based on the information available 
to them, so if examiners cannot tell whether the information is correct—and 
it is clear that the information available to examiners is often not correct—
then examiners’ decisions will sometimes be wrong.  When information in 
the patent application itself is wrong, examiners may erroneously grant a 
patent that is not actually useful, enabled, or adequately described (all 
requirements of patentability), which may then allow patentees to 
undeservedly monopolize an area and block future research that might lead 
to beneficial inventions.17  When evidence in the prior art is wrong, 
examiners may erroneously reject a patent that is in fact novel and 
nonobvious, diminishing the patent reward and commensurate incentives to 
invent.18 
There is substantial scholarship on errors that occur during patent 
examination, which are a major policy challenge.19  However, this Article 
demonstrates that existing scholarship focuses primarily on errors caused by 
 
 10. 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 11. See MPEP § 2107(II) (9th ed. Rev. 10, June 2020). 
 12. Id. (“Office personnel are reminded that they must treat as true a statement of fact 
made by an applicant in relation to an asserted utility . . . .”). 
 13. 35 U.S.C. § 102; see Elan Pharms., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Rsch., 346 
F.3d 1051, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 14. See MPEP § 904.  Examiners are not restricted to written literature. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. § 2121 (“[T]he reference is presumed to be operable.”); see also In re Antor Media 
Corp., 689 F.3d 1282, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[A]n examiner is entitled to reject claims as 
anticipated by a prior art publication or patent without conducting an inquiry into whether or 
not that prior art reference is enabling.”). 
 17. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 18. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 19. See infra Part III. 
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failure to find information—matching errors.20  Little scholarship concerns 
errors caused by failure to evaluate information—digging errors.  This 
Article predicts that digging errors will be common because the process of 
examination fails entirely to screen for information quality.21 
This Article then turns to mechanisms to prevent or fix examination errors.  
At the outset, existing policies targeted at fixing errors will be ineffective to 
address digging errors because these policies rely on the public to find 
errors.22  But errors in evaluating information, unlike errors in finding 
information, may be invisible to the public.  For example, if a patent states 
that an invention works, the public does not have access to the evidence 
underlying that statement and therefore cannot easily disagree.23  Further, 
errors caused by failure to dig into the quality of information are difficult to 
prevent at the examination stage because examiners simply do not have the 
expertise, capability, funding, facilities, or time to comprehensively assess 
information quality.24  This Article proposes a variety of solutions that (1) 
encourage information gathering and (2) place the burden of fact-checking 
more heavily on the parties involved in submitting the application.25 
The matching-digging dichotomy also implicates the relationship between 
prosecution and litigation, both in terms of how this interface is theorized and 
for concrete policy proposals.  Prosecution is currently viewed as an 
examination system, with litigation as a backstop to review errors.26  But 
prosecution is actually a registration system where examiners check to ensure 
that an application contains all required components but where they do not 
dig into the accuracy of these components.  Litigation, by contrast, is an 
examination proceeding where courts can and do assess the quality of 
evidence.  Many aspects of patentability traditionally thought to be assessed 
during prosecution are thus in reality postponed for evaluation in litigation.  
The matching-digging dichotomy suggests that courts should give patents a 
presumption of matching (i.e., that the examiner searched for matching 
evidence) but that there is no basis for a presumption of digging (i.e., that 
matching evidence found by the examiner is correct). 
Additionally, prosecution and litigation doctrines should be decoupled.  
Under current law, litigants can argue that a granted patent is invalid and 
courts will review validity using many of the same doctrines that apply in 
 
 20. Matching errors occur when an examiner (erroneously) fails to find a statement 
matching the patent’s claims in the prior art, resulting in the grant of a patent that either is not 
novel or is obvious. See infra Part III. 
 21. See infra Part II.B. 
 22. See infra Part III.A.1.c. 
 23. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 24. See infra Part III.A. 
 25. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 26. See Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast:  Property 
Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 592 
(1999). 
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prosecution.27  However, if litigation involves a fundamentally different 
analysis, courts should not be constrained by doctrines developed by the 
PTO.  This Article explains that several of patent law’s more perplexing 
doctrines can be understood as shortcuts to transform digging tasks—which 
are beyond the capabilities of patent examiners—into matching tasks, which 
are more readily accomplished.28  Because these doctrines are concessions to 
a weakness of examination that has no parallel in litigation, the doctrines 
should not apply in litigation. 
A final payoff of the matching-digging dichotomy is to highlight that most 
of examiners’ workload—matching tasks—consists of the type of job that 
can be done using artificial intelligence.29  Increasing the use of artificial 
intelligence might therefore free an examiner’s time to perform more difficult 
tasks, such as digging into the quality of evidence. 
Part I provides background on the patent examination process.  It then sets 
out the matching-digging divide by explaining how examiners match but do 
not dig into the quality of information.  Part II models different types of 
patent errors under the matching-digging framework and shows that certain 
types of errors will be common results of failure to dig into information.  Part 
III turns to implications and policy reform, beginning with suggestions for 
fixing digging errors, followed by reforms for litigation, and concluding with 
a discussion of the potential for automating patent prosecution. 
I.  INFORMATION AND PATENT EXAMINATION 
A.  Background on Examination 
The purpose of patent examination is to screen out applications that do not 
meet the requirements of patentability.  Patents impose a burden on the public 
in the form of higher prices during the term of the patent, so they should only 
be granted if they provide a public benefit by disclosing new and useful 
technologies.  This quid pro quo—patentees gets the exclusive right to their 
inventions in return for providing knowledge to the public—is designed to 
incentivize innovation.  It gives patentees an opportunity to profit from their 
inventions and also adds to the public repository of knowledge. 
Each patent undergoes examination at the PTO to ensure that it meets the 
requirements for patentability.  The invention, which is defined by a portion 
of the patent called the “claims,”30 must be novel31 and nonobvious,32 
meaning that it has never been previously publicly disclosed, nor is it an 
obvious variation of something previously disclosed.33  To assess novelty 
 
 27. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2).  Note that some doctrines differ between prosecution 
and litigation, notably claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation during 
prosecution. MPEP § 2111 (9th ed. Rev. 10, June 2020). 
 28. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 29. See infra Part III.C. 
 30. 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(a) (2020). 
 31. 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
 32. Id. § 103. 
 33. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 400 (2007). 
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and nonobviousness, examiners search the “prior art” (the universe of public 
disclosures made before the patent was filed) to determine if the invention or 
related concepts were already known.34 
The invention must also be useful,35 enabled (disclosed in sufficient detail 
such that other scientists can make and use the invention),36 and adequately 
described.37  These requirements pertain to information in the patent 
application itself, called the “specification.”38  Examiners will check the 
specification to ensure that it describes the invention (as defined in the 
claims), contains a statement of utility, and includes specifics about how to 
make and use the invention.39  This ensures both that the patent goes to an 
inventor who has developed the invention to a stage where it is useful and 
that the patent discloses enough information that other scientists can develop 
improvements and downstream iterations of the technology. 
Finally, the invention must also meet certain other requirements, such as 
relating to subject matter that can be patented40 and including claims that 
clearly outline the boundaries of the patent.41 
B.  Matching 
This Article argues that evidentiary analysis, such as that done in patent 
examination, can be understood as a process consisting of two steps:  
matching and digging.  Part II.B defines matching and explores how 
matching is used to assess patentability.  Part II.C argues that while the 
existence of certain pieces of information is a vital component of the 
examination process, the accuracy of that information is not—examiners do 
not dig into information quality. 
Matching is defined as selecting a statement and searching for a similar 
statement documented elsewhere.  For example, I propose that “the sky is 
blue.”  This statement matches to many other statements in other sources, 
including a short article by NASA explaining why the sky is blue.42  In the 
context of patent examination, matching involves taking the claimed 
invention and asking whether evidence of the claimed invention exists 
elsewhere. 
 
 34. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 22 (1966). 
 35. 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 36. Id. § 112(a). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See, e.g., In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1562–63 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 40. 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 41. See id. § 112(b). 
 42. Why Is the Sky Blue?, NASA SCI. SPACEPLACE (Apr. 21, 2020), 
https://spaceplace.nasa.gov/blue-sky/en/ [https://perma.cc/R5aJK-J5WZ]. 
2120 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
 










Novelty Prior Art Not Patentable 
Obviousness Prior Art Not Patentable 
Enablement Specification Patentable 
Written Description Specification Patentable 
Utility Specification Patentable 
 
Patents are only granted on inventions that are novel and nonobvious:  that 
have not been previously publicly disclosed and are not obvious based on the 
sum of existing knowledge.43  When a patent application is submitted, 
examiners must therefore determine if the invention has been previously 
disclosed in a publicly available source—the prior art—or whether it would 
be obvious over such disclosures.44  Examiners do this by searching the prior 
art for disclosures that match the claimed invention.45  An application will be 
rejected for lack of novelty if a piece of prior art matches all aspects of the 
claimed invention.46  An application will be rejected for obviousness if each 
part of the invention matches some disclosure in the prior art and it would be 
obvious to combine those disclosures.47 
For example, an applicant claimed to have invented a process for rendering 
fruit rind resistant to mold by “subjecting fruit to the action of an aqueous 
solution of borax.”48  In order to determine if the invention was patentable, 
the examiner had to search for a matching statement in prior published 
documents.  The examiner found a match:  a document published several 
years earlier describing a method “to prolong the period of usefulness of 
 
 43. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103; MPEP § 2131 (9th ed. Rev. 10, June 2020) (“A claimed 
invention may be rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102 when the invention is anticipated (or is ‘not 
novel’) over a disclosure that is available as prior art.”).  Patents impose a cost on society by 
allowing the patentee to charge higher prices for a product.  In return, patents disclose 
information about technology that might otherwise be kept secret.  Thus, patents are only 
granted on technology that has not been previously disclosed, because otherwise the cost 
would not be worth the benefit. See, e.g., Suzanne Scotchmer & Jerry Green, Novelty and 
Disclosure in Patent Law, 21 RAND J. ECON. 131, 132 (1990). 
 44. MPEP § 901. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. § 2131. 
 47. Id. § 2141. 
 48. Am. Fruit Growers v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 6 (1931). 
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fruit . . . .  [consisting of] [t]he application of boracic acid.”49  The 
application was therefore deemed not novel and was rejected.  The examiner 
evaluated the patentability of the invention by matching the claims of the 
patent application to statements in the prior art. 
Examiners also use matching techniques to evaluate the enablement 
requirement.  Enablement requires that patents provide sufficient information 
about the invention so that it can be made and used by others in the field 
without undue experimentation.50  To assess whether this is the case, 
examiners take each element of the claimed invention and seek to match it to 
a description in the patent’s specification of how the element is made and 
used.51  If one or more steps is missing from the patent’s description, the 
examiner will reject the patent for lack of enablement.52  This is a matching 
technique.  Examiners take statements from the claims and seek matching 
explanations for that information in the patent. 
For example, a patent claim was directed to using x-rays to differentiate 
types of plastics, a process which, among other things, required “selecting 
for processing” the x-ray signals that did not pass through the plastics.53  The 
patent specification did not explain how to select those signals—in other 
words, the specification did not contain a match for a necessary step in the 
claim—therefore, the patent was not enabled.54 
Matching also occurs when examiners evaluate the written description 
requirement.  Written description requires that patents contain enough 
information to show that the inventors were “in possession” of the claimed 
invention.55  This is presumed to be the case if “the claimed invention is 
present in the specification.”56  Determining if the claimed invention is in the 
specification is a matching task.  For each element of the claimed invention, 
the examiner checks to see if matching information is present in the 
specification.  If there is no match for a part of the claimed invention, the 
examiner can reject the patent.57  For example, a patent claiming a method 
of conducting debit card transactions using multiple authorization codes did 
not have an explanation in the specification that included multiple 
authorization codes and thus, was rejected for lack of written description.58  
 
 49. Id. at 13.  Note that in this case, boracic acid was sufficiently similar to borax, such 
that it anticipated the applicant’s invention. 
 50. 35 U.S.C. § 112; In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 733 (Fed. Cir. 1988).  The purpose of 
enablement is to ensure that information about new inventions is disseminated to the public 
so that others can recreate and improve on the technology. Janet Freilich, The Replicability 
Crisis in Patent Law, 95 IND. L.J. 431, 438 (2020). 
 51. See MPEP § 2164.06(a). 
 52. Id. (“It is common that doubt arises about enablement because information is missing 
about one or more essential claim elements.”). 
 53. Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1195 
(Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 54. See id. at 1196. 
 55. Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 56. In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 262 (C.C.P.A. 1976); see also MPEP § 2163(II)(A). 
 57. See, e.g., MPEP § 2163(II)(A). 
 58. Stored Value Sols., Inc. v. Card Activation Techs., Inc., 499 F. App’x 5, 13–14 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012). 
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Because the specification had no match for the “multiple authorization 
codes” portion of the claim, the patent was not valid.59 
Finally, examiners use matching to assess the utility requirement for 
patentability.  Inventions can only be patented if they are useful.60  Inventions 
are not useful if they have no purpose or are impossible.  Patents should 
include a statement about the utility of the invention:  an explanation for how 
the invention can be used.61  When examining a patent for utility, the 
examiner matches the claimed invention to the statement of utility in the 
specification.62  For example, a patent application claimed a particular 
compound and, in the specification, stated that the compound was useful as 
a plant fungicide.63  Because there was a match between the claimed 
compound and the disclosed utility, the application satisfied the utility 
requirement.64 
C.  Digging 
As shown above, patent examiners search for information matching the 
claimed invention in both the prior art and in the patent application itself.  
This part argues that patent examiners do not dig into the quality of the 
information they find.  Although examiners look for evidence of patentability 
both in the prior art and the patent specification, they do not assess whether 
that evidence is correct. 
The strongest indication that examiners are not digging into the quality of 
evidence comes from the PTO’s own admission.  The PTO straightforwardly 
confesses that it does not and cannot determine whether certain types of 
information are correct.  For example, the examiner in Ex Parte Baker65 cited 
a statement in the prior art that a particular antibody could bind to a protein—
 
 59. Id.  Examiners also use matching to determine if applicants can amend the claims of 
their applications.  Amendments cannot introduce new matter into the claims—doing so 
violates the written description requirement. See Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 
1247, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The written description requirement prevents applicants from 
using the amendment process to update their disclosures . . . .”).  Thus, to determine if an 
amendment adds material that is not in the originally filed application, the examiner matches 
the material added in the amendment to material already in the specification. MPEP 
§ 2163(II)(B). 
 60. 35 U.S.C. § 101.  As with novelty and nonobviousness, society should not bear the 
cost of a patent if the disclosed invention has no use or if the inventor does not or cannot 
describe the use. See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (“Until the process 
claim has been reduced to production of a product shown to be useful, the metes and bounds 
of that monopoly . . . .  may engross a vast, unknown, and perhaps unknowable area.  Such a 
patent may confer power to block off whole areas of scientific development, without 
compensating benefit to the public.”). 
 61. MPEP § 2107.02(II)(A).  Patents must have a statement to “fully and clearly explain 
why the applicant believes the invention is useful.  Such statements will usually explain the 
purpose of or how the invention may be used . . . .” Id. 
 62. The PTO instructs examiners to “(A) Read the claims and . . . .  [d]etermine what the 
applicant has claimed” and “(B) . . . determine if the applicant has asserted for the claimed 
invention any specific and substantial utility that is credible.” Id. § 2107 (II). 
 63. In re Gottlieb, 328 F.2d 1016, 1019 (C.C.P.A. 1964). 
 64. Id. 
 65. No. 2006-2892, 2007 WL 630236 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 26, 2007). 
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but the PTO also acknowledged that it could not check whether that statement 
was true, explaining that “the Office does not have the facilities for 
examining and comparing Appellant’s protein/antibody.”66  In Ex Parte 
Reguri,67 the applicants claimed a particular form of valsartan, a drug that 
treats hypertension.68  Prior art had disclosed a similar form, but the applicant 
contended that it was not a true match because, if the examiner were to test 
the prior art composition, it would be clear that the prior art disclosed a 
slightly different form of valsartan.69  The Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences rejected the applicant’s argument and explained that the 
examiner could not verify which type of valsartan was disclosed by the prior 
art because the “Office does not have the facilities to determine what form or 
admixtures of forms” the prior art compound takes.70 
Courts agree with the PTO’s explanation that it is unable to dig into the 
quality of evidence.  In Corning Glass Works v. Anchor Hocking Glass 
Corp.,71 the applicant made certain misrepresentations to the PTO.72  The 
court explained that dishonesty in PTO proceedings was a particular problem 
because “an examiner has no way, in many cases, to ascertain the truthfulness 
of the representations made to him.”73  In Charles Pfizer & Co. v. FTC,74 
Pfizer presented misleading information to the examiner.75  The court 
remarked that this misleading information caused the examiner to 
erroneously grant the patent because the “Patent Office, not having testing 
facilities of its own, must rely upon information furnished by applicants.”76 
These passages demonstrate that the PTO lacks the ability to evaluate the 
veracity of evidence in certain scenarios and instead merely assumes that 
relevant information is true.  However, failure to evaluate evidence is 
considerably more widespread, and it permeates every aspect of examiner 
behavior.  The sections below survey PTO rules and practices to investigate 
how examiners assess evidence. 
1.  Treatment of Prior Art References 
Examiners fail to evaluate the quality of evidence in prior art documents 
used to reject an application.  This occurs because legal doctrine allows 
examiners to assume that information in prior art is accurate—obviating the 
need to dig—even though there is ample reason to believe that much 
information in prior art is not accurate. 
 
 66. Id. at *3. 
 67. No. 2007-0313, 2007 WL 2745815 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 6, 2007). 
 68. Id. at *2. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at *7. 
 71. 253 F. Supp. 461 (D. Del. 1966), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 374 F.2d 473 (3d Cir. 
1967). 
 72. Id. at 470. 
 73. Id. 
 74. 401 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1968). 
 75. Id. at 579. 
 76. Id. 
2124 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
When an examiner rejects a patent for lack of novelty or for obviousness, 
she will cite to specific prior art references that either anticipated or rendered 
the invention obvious.77  This citation indicates that the examiner has 
searched the prior art and found a reference that matches the claimed 
invention.78  According to patent doctrine, a reference used for an 
anticipation rejection must be enabled, meaning that the invention disclosed 
in the prior art must be operable or could be operable without undue 
experimentation.79  The rationale for this requirement is that inventors should 
not get patents on inventions that are already in the possession of the public.80  
Further, in order for the public to possess an invention, the prior art must do 
more than just disclose an idea—the prior art must teach the public how to 
make a working version of the invention.81 
However, in practice, the examiner need only find prior art that discloses 
the applicant’s invention and need not ask whether the reference discloses 
something that actually works.82  The PTO instructs examiners that, if the 
reference is used for an anticipation or obviousness rejection, “the reference 
is presumed to be operable.”83  This means that examiners must find a 
disclosure of the invention in the prior art but can then assume that the 
statements are accurate and need not dig into their quality. 
The Federal Circuit has confirmed that “an examiner is entitled to reject 
claims as anticipated by a prior art publication . . . without conducting an 
inquiry into whether or not that prior art reference is enabling.”84  The 
Federal Circuit explained that the examiner is not required to investigate 
whether the prior art works because “[i]t would be overly cumbersome, 
perhaps even impossible, to impose on the PTO the burden of showing that 
a cited piece of prior art is enabling.  The PTO does not have laboratories for 
testing disclosures for enablement.”85  Thus, as long as examiners have found 
the applicant’s invention disclosed in the prior art, they need not ask whether 
the prior art is accurate—and indeed, examiners generally could not dig into 
the prior art’s accuracy. 
 
 77. MPEP §§ 2131, 2143 (9th ed. Rev. 10, June 2020). 
 78. See infra Part III.A. 
 79. Elan Pharms., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Rsch., 346 F.3d 1051, 1054 
(Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Donohue, 766 F.2d 531, 533 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 80. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989) 
(explaining that the novelty requirement “express[es] a congressional determination that the 
creation of a monopoly in [publicly disclosed] information would . . . serve no socially useful 
purpose”). 
 81. In re Donohue, 766 F.2d at 533 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that prior art must 
“sufficiently describe the claimed invention to have placed the public in possession of it” and 
that, as part of this requirement, the description must be enabling). 
 82. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003); 
In re Sasse, 629 F.2d 675, 677 (C.C.P.A. 1988). 
 83. MPEP § 2121(I) (9th ed. Rev. 10, June 2020). 
 84. In re Antor Media Corp., 689 F.3d 1282, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 85. Id. at 1288. 
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With respect to obviousness, there is no requirement that the prior art be 
enabled.86  A patent application can be rejected on the grounds that it is 
obvious over prior art even if the author of the prior art did not know how to 
make the invention.87  Thus, the examiner is free of even a nominal burden 
to determine if the prior art disclosure is correct. 
Further evidence that examiners do not dig into the quality of information 
used during the novelty and nonobviousness analyses comes from the types 
of sources used by examiners.  Examiners almost always cite to patents, 
rather than to journal articles or other types of disclosures, as prior art.88  
Patents have no indicators to distinguish good quality patents from poor 
quality patents, unlike journal articles, where the journal of publication might 
so indicate.  Thus, the prior art used most often by examiners lacks indicators 
that could be used to evaluate its informational value. 
Moreover, examiners are more likely to cite to abandoned patent 
applications than to granted patents.89  Abandoned patent applications may 
never have been reviewed by a patent examiner, so the quality of the 
statements therein is essentially the same as a self-published piece of 
writing.90  This practice is explicitly permitted by the PTO, which instructs 
examiners to give prior art patents the same evidentiary weight as prior art 
patent applications.91 
Examiners fail to consider the quality of statements in prior art even when 
it should be clear that the prior art is blatantly incorrect.  As discussed above, 
Theranos filed a patent on a method of measuring analytes in small drops of 
blood.92  An examiner cited the Theranos patent as prior art to reject as 
obvious a downstream patent claiming a method of measuring analytes in 
small drops of sweat.93  The rejection occurred in 2019, long after Theranos’s 
inability to make their technology functional had been well publicized.94  Yet 
the examiner argued that it was obvious how to measure molecules in small 
 
 86. Metso Mins., Inc. v. Powerscreen Int’l Distrib. Ltd., 526 F. App’x 988, 994–95 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013); Geo M. Martin Co. v. All. Mach. Sys. Int’l LLC, 618 F.3d 1294, 1302–03 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010). 
 87. Geo M. Martin, 619 F.3d at 1303. 
 88. Colleen Chien, Comparative Patent Quality, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 71, 121–22 (2018). 
 89. Christopher A. Cotropia & David L. Schwartz, The Hidden Value of Abandoned 
Applications to the Patent System, 61 B.C. L. REV. 2809, 2810 (2020).  Applications are 
deemed abandoned if the applicant stops pursuing the application. Id. at 2811 n.3. 
 90. The quality is perhaps slightly higher, since filing a patent costs several hundred 
dollars and therefore may dissuade at least some poorly researched ideas. See Jonathan S. 
Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 687, 687 (2008) 
(explaining that the high cost of patent review may screen out low value patents). 
 91. MPEP § 2121(II) (9th ed. Rev. 10, June 2020) (“The level of disclosure required 
within a reference to make it an ‘enabling disclosure’ is the same no matter what type of prior 
art is at issue.  It does not matter whether the prior art reference is a U.S. patent, foreign patent, 
a printed publication [a patent application] or other.”). 
 92. U.S. Patent No. 10,156,579 col. 24 l. 7 (filed Feb. 26, 2016) (issued Dec. 18, 2018) 
(“A method of detecting an analyte in a small-volume blood sample obtained from a subject, 
comprising:  a) obtaining a sample of blood from a subject by lancing or pipetting, said blood 
sample having a volume of less than about 500 μL.”). 
 93. WIPO Patent Application No. 2018/013579 (filed July 11, 2017). 
 94. Id. 
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drops of liquid because Theranos had already done it.95  This nonsensical 
approach shows that the examiner was matching (finding a reference that 
disclosed the technique) without digging (evaluating the reliability of that 
reference). 
2.  Utility 
A second demonstration that patent examiners are not assessing the quality 
of evidence used to evaluate patentability comes from the PTO’s instructions 
to examiners on how to assess whether a patent application is useful.  As 
explained above, patent examiners assess utility by finding a statement in the 
patent document that explains how the invention can be used.96  However, 
after finding such a statement, examiners generally accept it at face value and 
do not attempt to assess its reliability. 
Patent examiners are not required to accept the applicant’s assertion that 
the invention is useful as true.97  But the PTO emphasizes that rejections on 
the grounds that the examiner doubts the veracity of the applicant’s statement 
are “rare” and instances of such rejections being upheld by a federal court 
“even rarer.”98  Further, although examiners are permitted to request that the 
applicant provide additional evidence of utility if the examiner is not satisfied 
with the initial statement, such requests for additional evidence “should be 
imposed rarely.”99  The PTO allows examiners to dispute an applicant’s 
stated utility only where the assertion is “incredible in view of contemporary 
knowledge” and not merely where “there may be reason to believe that the 
assertion is not entirely accurate.”100  Indeed, the PTO explains that 
examiners reject applications for lack of credible utility mainly when the 
claimed invention “violate[s] a scientific principle, such as the second law of 
thermodynamics.”101  Patents on perpetual motion machines, which are 
physically impossible, are filed with surprising regularity.102 
To paraphrase, the PTO instructs examiners to accept the applicant’s stated 
utility unless it is utterly impossible.  The expectation appears to be that, with 
respect to evidence of utility, examiners search for information about utility 
but do not dig into the quality of the information. 
3.  Enablement and Written Description 
To determine if a patent is enabled, examiners must ask whether there is 
sufficient evidence in the patent document to teach others in the field how to 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. See supra Part II.B. 
 97. E.g., MPEP § 2107(II) (9th ed. Rev. 10, June 2020) (describing rejections where an 
examiner challenged the applicant’s asserted utility on the basis that the applicant’s statement 
was “incredible in the light of the knowledge of the art”). 
 98. Id. § 2107.01(II). 
 99. Id. § 2107.02(V). 
 100. Id. § 2107.02 (III)(B). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
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make and use the invention.103  The written description requirement calls for 
a similar assessment of evidence in the patent document to ensure that the 
inventor is in possession of the claimed invention.104  As discussed 
previously, examiners do this by asking whether relevant information is 
present in the patent document.105  This section explains that once the 
examiner finds such information, she does not inquire further into its quality 
unless the information is plainly unbelievable. 
As an initial assessment of whether examiners dig into information quality, 
I reviewed one hundred randomly selected enablement and written 
description rejections106 where the examiner asserted that at least one claim 
of a patent application was not enabled and/or adequately described.107  I 
asked whether the examiner rejected the application on the grounds that (1) 
he could not find relevant information or (2) that she found relevant 
information but the information was not accurate.  In all one hundred 
rejections, the examiner rejected the application on the first ground:  that 
some piece of necessary information could not be found.108  In none of the 
rejections did the examiner state that relevant information was present but 
that the information was unreliable.  This is threshold evidence that 
examiners seek the presence of information but do not evaluate its accuracy. 
Of course, if all information found by examiners were plainly correct, 
examiners would not need to discuss its accuracy.  However, that is not the 
case.  In many instances, examiners accepted evidence that was so unclear 
that its accuracy could not possibly have been evaluated.  For instance, an 
important source of evidence in patents is visual evidence (drawings), but 
this evidence can be of such poor quality that it is impossible that the 
examiner could have understood the drawings.  The images below, for 
example, are part of the inventors’ efforts to enable and describe the 
inventions.  However, because the drawings are utterly incomprehensible 
(the viewer is supposed to see a white arrow pointing at something visible, 
 
 103. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). 
 104. Id. 
 105. And how to combine it with other elements. See supra Part I.B. 
 106. These were selected from the Office Action Research Dataset for Patents. See 
generally U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., Office Action Research Dataset for Patents, 
https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/electronic-data-products/office-action-
research-dataset-patents [https://perma.cc/J9FL-JC43] (last visited Mar. 16, 2021).  For more 
information on this dataset, see Qiang Lu et al., USPTO Patent Prosecution Research Data:  
Unlocking Office Action Traits (USPTO Econ. Working Paper No. 2017-10, 2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3024621 [https://perma.cc/E36V-XLQD]. 
 107. Applications are often rejected for both lack of enablement and written description. 
Lu et al., supra note 106, at 2. 
 108. The following example illustrates a rejection made because the examiner could not 
find some piece of information relevant to enablement.  A patent, filed by DaimlerChrysler, 
claims an improved windshield wiper blade with “two projections extending laterally from 
first end of” the bow of the blade. U.S. Patent Application No. 11/085,332 para. 7 (filed Mar. 
21, 2005) (issued Sept. 21, 2006).  The examiner rejected the application for lack of 
enablement because “there does not appear to be any disclosure of . . . projections . . . 
extending laterally . . . .” Non-Final Rejection 5 (U.S. Patent Application No. 11/085,332) 
(filed Mar. 21, 2006).  The examiner made the rejection because he did not find a match in the 
specification for the wiper blade described in the claim. 
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not a black square), the images clearly do not teach others how to make and 
use the invention, nor do they prove that the inventor was in possession of 
the invention.109  Yet, the examiners did not mention that the drawings do 
not show what the description purports them to show.110 
Figure 1:  Inventor Drawings111 
 
Examiners receiving patents with poor quality images are permitted to ask 
the applicants to revise the images.112  The Manual of Patent Examining 
Procedure specifically states that photographs (like those above) “must be of 
sufficient quality so that all details in the photographs are reproducible in the 
printed patent.”113  That examiners do not request clearer images suggests 
that examiners are simply checking the boxes when it comes to enablement—
looking for a statement of enablement and written description (the patentee’s 
explanation of the image) but ignoring whether the statement is supported by 
evidence (the image itself).  For instance, the examiner in the application 
above must have accepted that “[m]etaphase chromosomes . . . are apparent 
in small dividing cardiomyocytes”114 on the strength of the statement alone 
because it is impossible to verify the statement by looking at the image. 
Examiners not only accept evidence that is incomprehensible, but they also 
accept evidence that is clearly wrong.  For example, U.S. Patent No. 
8,647,872 claims a method of producing embryonic stem cells and supports 
this claim by providing a detailed explanation of how the stem cells can be 
prepared.115  Unfortunately, the technique does not work:  a paper by the 
inventors in Science was retracted after a highly publicized scandal; the lead 
inventor was criminally charged and admitted in court that he had forged the 
 
 109. It is not clear why the black squares are in the patent application.  It is likely that they 
are poor quality photocopies of other images. 
 110. These drawings clearly contravene the PTO’s requirement that “[d]rawings will be 
accepted . . . if the drawings are readable and reproducible for publication purposes.” MPEP 
§ 608.02(b)(I) (9th ed. Rev. 10, June 2020). 
 111. The image on the left is from U.S. Patent No. 9,574,173 col. 12 l. 7 (filed Nov. 5, 
2011) (issued Feb. 21, 2017) (“[I]mmunofluorescence microscopic analysis indicates that the 
immunofluorescent GFP-tagged tNSCs still persisted in the lesioned striatum . . . .”).  The 
images on the right are drawn from U.S. Patent Application No. 12/324,031 [27] (filed Nov. 
26, 2008) (“Metaphase chromosomes (A and B:  blue, PI; arrows) . . . are apparent in small 
dividing cardiomyocytes . . . .”). 
 112. MPEP § 608.02(b)(I)–(II) (“Examiners should review the drawings for disclosure of 
the claimed invention . . . . if the original drawings are unacceptable, applicant will be notified 
and informed of what the objections are and that new corrected drawings are required.”). 
 113. 37 C.F.R. § 1.84(b)(1) (2020). 
 114. U.S. Patent Application No. 12/324,031 [27]. 
 115. U.S. Patent No. 8,647,872 claim 1 (filed Dec. 9, 2011) (issued Feb. 11, 2014). 
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data.116  In a strange twist, the trial also revealed that he had worked with the 
Russian mafia to clone extinct mammoths.117  The patent was granted more 
than ten years after the retraction made headlines in both the scientific and 
popular media, suggesting that there was ample opportunity for the PTO to 
learn about the retraction and reject the patent.118  The examiner was 
apparently looking only for statements that described how to make and use 
the stem cells—statements that were present in the application—but did not 
dig into the reliability (or lack thereof) of those statements.119 
II.  A NEW MODEL FOR EXAMINER ERRORS 
One consequence of examiners’ failure to evaluate the quality of 
information used to assess patentability is errors.  It is well known that patent 
examiners make frequent errors during examination.  There is a large body 
of scholarship on these errors and there are ongoing policy efforts to reduce 
and resolve these errors.120  However, existing scholarship and policy efforts 
focus almost exclusively on errors in finding information, whereas this 
Article predicts widespread errors in evaluating information.121  As a result, 
there are likely a significant number of errors that are not recognized by 
current scholarship.  While the existing consensus is that patent examiners 
 
 116. Hwang Admits Faking Data, SCI. (Oct. 30, 2006, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2006/10/hwang-admits-faking-data [https://perma.cc/ 
9WW3-VRXY]. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Andrew Pollack, Disgraced Scientist Granted U.S. Patent for Work Found to Be 
Fraudulent, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/15/science/ 
disgraced-scientist-granted-us-patent-for-work-found-to-be-fraudulent.html 
[https://perma.cc/W6MF-W7HK]. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See generally ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSHUA LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS:  
HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT 
TO DO ABOUT IT (2004); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-465, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY:  ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD 
HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY (2013); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-460, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:  PATENT OFFICE SHOULD DEFINE QUALITY, REASSESS INCENTIVES, 
AND IMPROVE CLARITY (2016); John R. Allison & Ronald J. Mann, The Disputed Quality of 
Software Patents, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 297 (2007); Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. 
Wasserman, Does the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Grant Too Many Bad Patents:  
Evidence from a Quasi-experiment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 613 (2015); Christi J. Guerrini, Defining 
Patent Quality, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3091 (2014); Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, 
Examining Patent Examination, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2; R. Polk Wagner, Understanding 
Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135 (2009); Stephen Yelderman, Improving 
Patent Quality with Applicant Incentives, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 77 (2014); Gaetan de 
Rassenfosse et al., Low-Quality Patents in the Eye of the Beholder:  Evidence from Multiple 
Examiners (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 22244, 2019), 
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w22244/w22244.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
9W9M-RDYF]. 
 121. Some scholars have written about errors caused by incorrect information, but this 
literature is substantially smaller than the literature on matching errors. See, e.g., Janet Freilich 
& Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Science Fiction:  Fictitious Experiments in Patents, 364 SCI. 
1036, 1036 (2019); Freilich, supra note 50, at 10; Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Pierson, Peer 
Review, and Patent Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1825, 1827 (2016); Sean B. Seymore, Making 
Patents Useful, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1046, 1092 (2014). 
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make a substantial number of errors, the true scope of the problem is likely 
considerably worse. 
This part begins by showing that current scholarship has focused on 
matching errors (failure to find information) and then explores the likely 
prevalence and consequences of digging errors (failure to evaluate 
information). 
A.  Matching Errors 
Almost all scholarship on patent errors and poor quality patents has 
focused on patents that are erroneously granted even though they are not 
novel or are obvious.122  These errors are caused by failure to find matching 
information.  When patent examiners assess whether the invention claimed 
in a patent application is novel or nonobvious, they search for prior public 
disclosures matching the invention.  Because the universe of prior public 
disclosures is exceedingly large123 and patent examiners have little time to 
process each application,124 they often overlook relevant prior art and grant 
a patent on an invention even though that invention has previously been 
disclosed.125 
Scholars studying these erroneously granted patents have identified the 
many problems that the errors cause for the patent system.  Erroneously 
granted patents are often used as the basis for demand letters, nuisance 
 
 122. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of 
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 208 (1998); Robert D. Atkinson & Daniel D. Castro, 
A National Technology Agenda for the New Administration, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 190, 193 
(2009); Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents:  Why 
Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review 
Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 944–46 (2004); Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity 
Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 71, 73 (2013); Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. 
Wasserman, Does Agency Funding Affect Decisionmaking:  An Empirical Assessment of the 
PTO’s Granting Patterns, 66 VAND. L. REV. 67, 71 (2013); Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring 
Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 20; Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent 
Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J. 181, 185 (2008); Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, 
Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 47 (2007); Merges, 
supra note 26, at 589; Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-competitive 
Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 541 (2003); Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains 
in the Administrative State:  The Patent Office’s Troubled Quest for Managerial Control, 157 
U. PA. L. REV. 2051, 2080 (2009); David Schumann, Obviousness with Business Methods, 56 
U. MIA. L. REV. 727, 764 (2002); Wagner, supra note 120, at 2139.  See generally JAMES 
BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE:  HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND 
LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2009); DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT 
CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2008); JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 120. 
 123. These disclosures may be in any language and originate in any country.  A disclosure 
may be considered public even it is relatively obscure.  For example, one Federal Circuit case 
famously held that a patent application was not novel because the invention had been 
previously disclosed in a PhD thesis that existed in one copy in a German library and may not 
have been catalogued at the time the patent was filed. In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898 (Fed. Cir. 
1986). 
 124. Patent examiners have approximately eighteen hours for each application. Mark A. 
Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1500 (2001). 
 125. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 122, at 247. 
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litigation, and extortion by patent trolls.126  Further, an abundance of patents, 
even if invalid, clutters the patent record and complicates freedom-to-operate 
searches,127 which can chill downstream research.  If later innovators see that 
there are hundreds of patents covering a field, they may believe that it would 
be too difficult to license patents in that field and therefore pick a different 
area of research, even if many of the patents are of dubious validity.128  
Erroneously granted patents are a substantial and important problem in patent 
law and have been the subject of many recent policy changes,129 
proposals,130 and initiatives, most recently a Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary hearing entitled “How Can Congress Prevent the Issuance of Poor 
Quality Patents?”131 
B.  Digging Errors 
Patent examiners can also make errors by failing to dig into the 
information used to make decisions about patentability.  As a threshold 
matter, an examiner’s failure to inquire into the quality of evidence will only 
lead to errors if the evidence reviewed by patent examiners is sometimes 
incorrect.  Part II.B.1 provides evidence that examiners indeed often consider 
incorrect information.  Part II.B.2 explores the consequences of errors that 
occur when an examiner believes that information is right but the information 
 
 126. See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent 
Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 678 (2011); Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 461, 466 (2014); Lauren Cohen et al., Patent Trolls:  Evidence from Targeted 
Firms, 65 MGMT. SCI. 5461, 5461 (2019); Mark D. Janis, Reforming Patent Validity 
Litigation:  The “Dubious Preponderance,” 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 923, 941 (2004).  
Because patent litigation is expensive and unpredictable, recipients of demand letters may be 
willing to pay a substantial sum to avoid litigation even if they believe a patent is invalid. 
 127. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE:  ALIGNING PATENT 
NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 116 (2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/reports/evolving-ip-marketplace-aligning-patent-notice-and-remedies-
competition-report-federal-trade/110307patentreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/2D3A-A4DY]; 
see also Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradeable Patent Rights, 60 STAN. L. REV. 863, 
867 (2007); Iain M. Cockburn et al., Patent Thickets, Licensing and Innovative Performance, 
19 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 899, 905 (2010); Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman, Patent 
Thickets, Courts, and the Market for Innovation, 41 RAND J. ECON. 472, 472 (2010). 
 128. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical 
Research on Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 16 (2005); Michael A. Heller & 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?:  The Anticommons in Biomedical 
Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698 (1998); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and 
Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 1993 (2007).  But see Lemley, supra note 122, at 21 
(suggesting that poor quality patents are generally ignored). 
 129. Reforms included in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 
Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.), were intended to 
“weed out . . . low quality patents.” H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 38–40 (2011); Paul R. Gugliuzza, 
IP Injury and the Institutions of Patent Law, 98 IOWA L. REV. 747, 748–49 (2013). 
 130. See, e.g., Patent Quality Improvement Act, S. 866, 113th Cong. (2013); Innovation 
Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 131. Promoting the Useful Arts:  How Can Congress Prevent the Issuance of Poor Quality 
Patents?:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intell. Prop. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
116th Cong. (2019), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/promoting-the-useful-arts-
how-can-congress-prevent-the-issuance-of-poor-quality-patents [https://perma.cc/C7P2-
VKY4]. 
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is in fact wrong.  Broadly, this can lead to two types of errors:  erroneous 
rejection of a patent application (when a prior art disclosure of the applicant’s 
invention is incorrect) or erroneous grant of a patent application (when the 
applicant’s evidence about the invention is incorrect).  These two types of 
errors are discussed in Parts II.B.2.a and II.B.2.b, respectively. 
In theory, digging errors could also occur if the examiner overdigs—i.e., 
believes that information is wrong but the information is in fact right.  This 
Article does not grapple with this sort of error because, given that patent 
examiners rarely inquire into the quality of evidence during examination,132 
it will not occur often in practice.  That is, patent examiners will not generally 
find that a statement is wrong if it is in fact right because they do not usually 
make rejections on the basis that a statement is wrong.133  However, it is 
worth noting that if patent procedures were reformed so that examiners dug 
into the quality of evidence, this type of error would become more common. 
1.  Information Available to Examiners Is Often Incorrect 
Examiner failure to dig into information quality only matters if that 
information is sometimes wrong.  As discussed here, there is substantial 
reason to believe that much evidence reviewed by patent examiners is 
incorrect. 
When examiners review the utility, enablement, and written description 
requirements, they use information in the patent application’s specification.  
This information is provided by the applicant and is often unreliable.  For 
one, applicants are permitted by patent law to include fictional experiments 
in applications, and examiners routinely accept these experiments as 
evidence of patentability.134  For example, an examiner granted a patent 
directed to a compound called Aristolochia paucinervis Pomel, at least in part 
on the basis of the following fictional reports from the patent applicant: 
A 67-year-old male has pancreatic cancer.  Although he receives 
chemotherapy and radiotherapy, six months later his therapy is 
discontinued because metastases are detected.  He is provided with A. 
paucinervis pomel extract for three years.  The patient is examined later, 
and has normal renal hepatic and pulmonary test results.  His tumor is 
reduced in mass. 
 . . . A 58-year-old patient’s history, hospitalized for icterus resulting from 
alcoholic hepatitis, is followed.  This patient receives one-half teaspoon of 
A. paucinervis pomel extract for 40 days, stops taking the extract for 10 
days, and then resumes taking the extract for an additional 40 days.  The 
patient reports no side effects of any sort for three years following this 
 
 132. See supra Part I.C. 
 133. See supra Part I.D. 
 134. Janet Freilich, Prophetic Patents, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 673 (2019). 
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regimen.  His transaminase level is normal, and no nephrotoxicity is 
observed in this patient.135 
Although the examiner was aware that the studies above were fictional 
(studies written in the present tense are assumed to be hypothetical),136 the 
examiner required no further evidence that the compound was useful.137 
My previous work has shown that 24 percent of life sciences and chemistry 
patents include fictional experiments.138  While fictional experiments are not 
necessarily incorrect, they are surely less likely to be correct than factual 
experiments.139  If examiners routinely accept fictional experiments as 
evidence of an invention’s utility and to meet the enablement and written 
description requirements, some of the examiner’s decisions will be mistaken. 
Even factual experiments in patent applications frequently have 
characteristics suggesting that they will not be replicable, such as small 
sample sizes, no statistical analysis, and failure to blind the investigators or 
randomize the subjects.140  The experiment below, for example, is taken from 
a patent claiming that Bag Balm (an ointment normally used on cow udders) 
can, when rubbed on the head, cause hair growth141: 
Subject, a hair dresser in his thirties, had tried many different products 
on his scalp before he began using BAG BALM.  He reports that BAG 
BALM is the best product he has ever used.  After about two (2) months of 
daily massaging of BAG BALM into his scalp, the bald spot on top of his 
head was filling-in some.142 
While I do not know whether or not Bag Balm would indeed have this 
effect, the replicability literature suggests that studies without controls, on 
only one subject and with few details about how the application was 
 
 135. U.S. Patent No. 8,003,137 exs. 15–16 (filed May 9, 2008) (issued Aug. 23, 2011).  
Doctors are skeptical that the compound would produce this effect if it were actually given to 
humans (and, in addition, the compound is highly toxic). See Freilich, supra note 134, at 666. 
 136. See MPEP § 608.01(p) (9th ed. Rev. 10, June 2020). 
 137. See id. § 2164. 
 138. See Freilich, supra note 134, at 668 (explaining that applicants are incentivized to 
include hypotheses (in the form of fictional experiments) in patents); Freilich & Larrimore 
Ouellette, supra note 121, at 1036. 
 139. See Freilich, supra note 134, at 702. 
 140. See Freilich, supra note 50, at 432 (explaining that the patent system is set up to 
encourage disclosure of early-stage data that is often incorrect and documenting that most 
preclinical experiments in life sciences patents bear hallmarks of irreplicability); Lisa 
Larrimore Ouellette, Who Reads Patents?, 35 NATURE BIOTECH. 421 fig.4 (2017) (surveying 
researchers regarding the likelihood that they could replicate an invention described in a patent 
in their field and finding that fewer than half believed they could); Jacob S. Sherkow, Patent 
Law’s Reproducibility Paradox, 66 DUKE L.J. 845, 845 (2017) (providing several examples 
of irreplicable disclosures in patents). 
 141. The examiner was skeptical of this example and rejected the patent for lack of utility. 
In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  However, the Federal Circuit reversed, 
explaining that examiners “cannot make this type of rejection, however, unless [they have] 
reason to doubt the objective truth of the statements contained in” the application. Id. at 1357. 
The court explained that this occurs when the patent “suggest[s] an inherently unbelievable 
undertaking,” which the above experiment does not because treatments for baldness do exist. 
Id. (quoting In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
 142. U.S. Patent No. 6,033,676 ex. 2 (filed Mar. 11, 1992) (issued Mar. 7, 2000). 
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conducted, are often not replicable.143  As with fictional experiments, if 
examiners regularly accept poor quality experiments as evidence of 
patentability, examiners’ decisions as to patentability may be erroneous. 
Further, if examiners never dig into the veracity of information in the 
patent, there is little incentive for applicants to ensure that the information in 
their applications is correct.  Applicants may therefore include speculative 
statements and preliminary experiments without being cautious about the 
accuracy of the information.  This suggests that the patent system has the 
practical effect of incentivizing inclusion of inaccurate statements in patent 
applications. 
With respect to examination for novelty and nonobviousness, examiners 
review evidence in the prior art.144  The prior art consists of the entire canon 
of publicly available information—and anyone who has spent time on the 
internet knows that much publicly available information is incorrect.  
Further, examiners predominantly search for prior art in the patent literature, 
meaning that they are searching for documents that suffer from the flaws 
described above.145 
2.  Types of Errors 
Given that much information available to examiners is incorrect and that 
examiners do not dig into the quality of that information, errors will occur.  
Relying on incorrect information during examination can lead both to 
erroneous grants and erroneous rejections of patent applications.  If the 
incorrect information is in the prior art, examiners will erroneously believe 
that the patent application is anticipated or obvious and will wrongly reject 
the application.  If the incorrect information is in the specification, examiners 
will erroneously believe that the applicant has satisfied the utility, 
enablement, and/or written description requirements and will wrongly grant 
the patent application. 
These two types of errors have fundamentally different sources and 
solutions.  Incorrect statements in the specification are the fault of the 
applicant146 and are also known to (or should be known to) the applicant.  
Incorrect statements in the prior art arise from external sources.147  This 
distinction impacts the policy tools available to address the errors, as 
discussed further below. 
a.  Erroneous Rejection 
Failure to dig into the quality of information used during examination 
causes erroneous rejection when a patent application that should have been 
granted is denied because it is rejected as either anticipated or obvious.  
 
 143. Freilich, supra note 50, at 449. 
 144. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103. 
 145. Chien, supra note 88, at 112–13. 
 146. Whether or not the statements are deliberately incorrect. 
 147. On occasion, prior art may be the applicant’s own previous public statements. 
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However, the rejection is incorrect because the alleged disclosure in the prior 
art in wrong. 
The following is an example of an erroneous rejection.  In 2013, 
researchers at Harvard University found that a compound called betatrophin 
could stimulate the growth of pancreatic β-cells, which are responsible for 
insulin production, and therefore might treat or even cure diabetes.148  
Unfortunately, the discovery was wrong.  The authors retracted the paper and 
stated that “the betatrophin hypothesis needs to be withdrawn.”149  In 2015, 
a separate research team from Scripps’s California Institute of Biomedical 
Research filed a patent application on a method of combining betatrophin 
with antibody regions known to enhance binding activity.150  The Scripps 
team claimed that these fusion proteins could be used to treat diabetes.151  In 
a series of rejections beginning in June 2017 (one year after the Harvard team 
had publicly acknowledged that its findings were incorrect), the examiner 
rejected the Scripps team’s application because, among other reasons, it was 
obvious over the Harvard team’s work.152 
The examiner stated repeatedly that the Scripps team’s use of a fused 
betatrophin-antibody protein to treat diabetes was obvious because the 
Harvard team “teaches a composition comprising betatrophin and an 
antibody that is used to treat diabetes.”153  However, the examiner’s 
statement about the teaching of the Harvard study is wrong, as evidenced by 
the subsequent retraction of the Harvard paper.154  Eventually, the Scripps 
team amended its claims to considerably narrow the scope of its application, 
losing patent scope at least in part because the examiner believed that the 
Harvard team’s research was correct.  It is possible that, while the Harvard 
team could not use betatrophin to treat diabetes, the Scripps variation could 
 
 148. Peng Yi et al., Betatrophin:  A Hormone that Controls Pancreatic β Cell Proliferation, 
153 CELL 747, 747 (2013). 
 149. Aaron R. Cox et al., Resolving Discrepant Findings on ANGPTL8 in β-Cell 
Proliferation:  A Collaborative Approach to Resolving the Betatrophin Controversy, PLOS 
ONE 17 (July 13, 2016), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/ 
journal.pone.0159276 [https://perma.cc/84UF-XZRQ]; see also Peng Yi et al., Retraction 
Notice to:  Betatrophin:  A Hormone that Controls Pancreatic β Cell Proliferation, 168 CELL 
326, 326 (2017) (“[W]e claimed that . . . betatrophin . . . induces robust β-cell replication in 
mice. . . .  When we repeated our original experiments with a larger number of mice, we also 
failed to observe β-cell expansion . . . .  [We] have now determined conclusively that our 
conclusion that . . . betatrophin causes specific β-cell replication is wrong and cannot be 
supported.”). 
 150. U.S. Patent No. 10,259,863 cols. 1–2 (filed Jan. 10, 2014) (issued Apr. 16, 2019). 
 151. Id. col. 7. 
 152. E.g., Final Rejection 3 (U.S. Patent No. 10,259,863) (filed June 22, 2017). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Note that prior art used in an obviousness rejection does not have to be enabled (that 
is, it does not have to work). MPEP § 2121.01 (9th ed. Rev. 10, June 2020).  However, 
obviousness rejections can be overcome by demonstrating that the prior art teaches away from 
the applicant’s invention, and a retraction notice that suggests that betatrophin does not treat 
diabetes certainly teaches away from using betatrophin to treat diabetes. See In re Gurley, 27 
F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“A reference may be said to teach away when a person of 
ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set 
out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by 
the applicant.”). 
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do so.  If that is the case, the patent system may be insufficiently incentivizing 
the second patent applicant in situations where the earlier patent or 
application contains unreliable evidence. 
Erroneous rejections of this sort could result in systematic undervaluing of 
second-comers’ research in fields where the first innovator’s research was 
speculative or outright wrong.  This may disincentivize such research 
because patents on second-comers’ research would either not be granted at 
all or would be narrower than expected.155  If innovators believe that they 
will not be adequately rewarded for their work, they may be deterred from 
innovation even before any encounter with the PTO.156  Thus, erroneous 
denials of patents may hamper incentives to innovate. 
However, erroneous rejections are not overly concerning because, though 
potentially serious if allowed to stand, they are readily fixable by the 
applicant.  In situations where an examiner has rejected an application using 
prior art that contains some suspect statement, the applicant can—and has 
every incentive to—dig into the evidence themselves.  The applicant can 
identify the problem with the prior art statement, tell the examiner that the 
prior art is wrong, and ask the examiner to withdraw the rejection.157  This 
was not done for the betatrophin patent discussed above (for unknown 
reasons)158 but patent applicants have done this successfully in other cases.  
For example, during prosecution of the patent covering an osteoporosis drug 
Evista, the applicants overcame an erroneous rejection by telling the 
examiner that the prior art contained errors;159 they were granted the patent 
and made several billion dollars in selling the drug.160  Digging errors that 
lead to erroneous rejections might be common and potentially harmful, but 
they can also be quickly fixed. 
 
 155. Andres Sawicki, Better Mistakes in Patent Law, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 735, 761–62 
(2012); Stephen Yelderman, The Value of Accuracy in the Patent System, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1217, 1220 (2017). 
 156. Yelderman, supra note 155, at 1220. 
 157. 37 C.F.R. § 1.111(b) (2020). 
 158. Perhaps the applicants were unaware of the retraction.  The scientists on the Scripps 
team presumably knew that Yi and Melton’s work had failed because it was a high-profile 
retraction. E.g., Damien Garde, Once-Promising Diabetes Breakthrough Isn’t After All 
Scientist Says, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 27, 2016, 7:38 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/ 
2016/12/27/diabetes-breakthrough-isn-after-all-scientist-says/4u4ljoUA1WgmupriqnOkYP/ 
story.html [https://perma.cc/2YYK-W35S].  However, the communications between the 
examiner and the applicant are generally written by attorneys, perhaps in consultation with a 
technology transfer office when, as here, the applicant is based out of a university.  The 
scientists themselves are not always consulted, which may explain the lack of response in this 
case. 
 159. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 967, 988 (S.D. Ind. 2009).  
The patent was originally rejected by the examiner as anticipated by an article that disclosed 
use of raloxifene to treat osteoporosis. Id.  The applicant submitted a declaration explaining 
certain flaws in the article that rendered it unreliable, after which the examiner granted the 
patent. Id. 
 160. Ten Blockbuster Drugs That Lost Patent in 2014, CLINICAL TRIALS ARENA (Nov. 20, 
2014, 6:30 PM), https://www.clinicaltrialsarena.com/features/featureten-blockbuster-drugs-
that-lost-patent-in-2014-4445799/ [https://perma.cc/XF7T-SNL5]. 
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b.  Erroneous Grant 
Errors in evaluating information quality that lead to erroneous grants are 
also common and potentially harmful but, unlike erroneous rejections, are 
difficult to fix.  An erroneous grant due to a digging mistake occurs when an 
examiner grants a patent that is in fact not useful, not enabled, or not 
adequately described.  In this type of error, an examiner will find that the 
patent application contains statements of utility, teachings of how to make 
and use the invention, and explanations showing possession, but these 
statements are not correct—which will not be discovered by the examiner 
because the examiner did not evaluate the reliability of the evidence. 
Unlike erroneous rejections, this type of error is unlikely to be fixed during 
prosecution.  There are two parties involved in patent prosecution:  the 
examiner and the applicant.  The examiner will not fix these digging errors 
because the examiner (having already made the error) evidently holds 
erroneous beliefs about the evidence under examination.  The applicant will 
not fix the error because there is no incentive for applicants to correct 
mistakes that cause their applications to be granted. 
These mistakes are harmful.  An erroneously granted patent gives its 
owner the exclusive right to make and use the invention where such a right 
is not warranted.161  These patents disincentivize inventors other than the 
patentee from working in the field covered by the patent because third parties 
must obtain a license from the patentee.  When a patent is erroneously 
granted due to a digging error—when the patentee does not actually know 
how to make and use the invention or is unaware of its utility—patent grant 
precludes others from discovering the invention’s use or how it works.  Since 
the inventor does not know how to make the invention and others are blocked 
from finding out, this has the practical effect of preventing anyone from 
making or using the invention.  If Jules Verne had been granted a patent on 
a submarine162 (which he imagined in his writing but could not actually 
make), he could have used the patent to block others who were trying to truly 
develop the technology and we might not have submarines.  Because 
Theranos was granted dozens of patents on diagnostic technology, these 
patents can be asserted against other innovators—even though Theranos 
could not make its technology work and other innovators appear to have 
working technology. 
Patents granted erroneously due to digging errors are a particular problem 
because they are often broad in scope and may cover—and block others from 
discovering—downstream uses that the patentee never thought of.163  The 
impact of erroneously granted patents is particularly acute in the United 
States because there are few exceptions to patent infringement.164  There are 
 
 161. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). 
 162. See generally JULES VERNE, TWENTY THOUSAND LEAGUES UNDER THE SEA (Chicago, 
Butler Bros. 1887). 
 163. See Freilich, supra note 134, at 688. 
 164. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (allowing patent owners to prevent others from making, using, 
selling, offering for sale, or importing their inventions). 
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no exceptions for independent invention,165 research that improves on a 
technology,166 socially desirable “fair use,”167 or use of a technology for 
public health or to save a life.168  Thus, the consequences of erroneous patent 
grants are severe. 
Finally, erroneous grants create harm because they publicize documents 
with incorrect information.  One purpose of patents is to publicly disclose 
information about new technologies that can then be used by others to build 
on and further develop the science.169  However, if the information in patents 
is wrong, the disclosure function of patents works poorly.170 
C.  Benefits of the Status Quo 
Examiner failure to dig into the quality of evidence during examination 
creates serious costs in the form of erroneously granted patents.  However, 
the current system—where examiners match but do not dig—has certain 
advantages. 
The first benefit of the status quo is the cost of examination.  Digging takes 
time and resources and is consequently expensive.  Asking examiners to 
verify evidence to prevent errors would be costly, and the cost may outweigh 
the expense of the errors themselves.171  Thus, a system where examiners 
 
 165. Several scholars have argued that there should be such an exception. See, e.g., Mark 
A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1525, 
1526 (2007); Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 
105 MICH. L. REV. 475, 476 (2006). 
 166. Although, under the reverse doctrine of equivalents, a device that literally falls within 
the claims of a patent may not infringe if it “has so far changed the principle of the device that 
the claims of the patent, literally construed, have ceased to represent” the device. 
Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 568 (1898).  However, the reverse 
doctrine of equivalents is functionally dead, as the Federal Circuit has never used it and has 
called the doctrine an “anachronistic exception, long mentioned but rarely applied.” Tate 
Access Floors v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Not 
once has this court affirmed a decision finding noninfringement based on the reverse doctrine 
of equivalents.”). 
 167. Such an exception exists for copyrights. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.  The statute excludes 
from infringement “fair use” of a copyrighted work, such as use for “criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research” and provides four factors to guide analysis of 
whether an action constitutes fair use. Id.  Scholars have argued that there should be a fair use 
doctrine in patent. See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1178 (2000). 
 168. Under the Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.), the government has “march-in rights” to patents 
funded by federal agencies and can require the patentee to grant a license to the patented 
technology if “action is necessary to alleviate health or safety needs.” 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2).  
However, these rights are somewhat illusory as they have never been used. 
 169. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (“[T]hings 
which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system which by 
constitutional command must ‘promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.’” (alteration in 
original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8)). 
 170. See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Secrecy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1769, 1805 
(2016) (“[D]isclosure is undoubtedly a key component of cumulative innovation . . . .”). 
 171. Compare Lemley, supra note 124, at 1495, with Michael Frakes & Melissa 
Wasserman, Irrational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 72 VAND. L. REV. 975, 976 (2019). 
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search for, but do not evaluate the quality of evidence, is substantially 
cheaper and faster than the alternative. 
A second benefit of a system where examiners only conduct a matching 
analysis is the consistency and standardizability of examination.  There are 
thousands of patent examiners.172  Ideally, the outcome of prosecution should 
not depend on the individual examiner to which the patent is assigned.173  
Thus, each examiner should follow a set of processes that can be standardized 
across the PTO and that would result in similar outcomes if followed by a 
different examiner.  This goal is easier to achieve for matching than for 
digging because matching is more objective.  If one were to search a database 
for a particular technology and get a specific result, someone else searching 
in the same database for the same technology should be able to obtain similar 
findings.174  The precise outcome will of course differ based on choices such 
as search terms but, on the whole, the process ought to be at least somewhat 
replicable. 
By contrast, digging into the veracity of evidence is considerably harder to 
standardize.  How would examiners know when to accept a statement as true 
or when to dig further?  If digging further, what sources should be consulted?  
When is a source sufficiently reliable to corroborate a statement?  Protocols 
can certainly be developed to standardize this process, but there is more 
subjective judgment involved for digging than for matching, so consistency 
in digging is harder to achieve. 
For similar reasons, it is easier to document, explain, and challenge 
matching decisions than digging decisions.  Examiners record search 
strategies175 and then write a letter to the applicant stating any matches found 
between the application’s claims and the prior art.176  For example, in a 
sample patent application claiming “extruding a chlorinated polymer” at an 
angle of 30 degrees, the examiner wrote that a prior art reference by Berridge 
taught an extruding chlorinated polymer and a prior art reference by McGee 
taught extrusions of 25–35 degrees.177  Thus, it is well documented that each 
 
 172. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 171, at 613. 
 173. Although there is substantial evidence that it does. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & 
Bhaven Sampat, Examiner Characteristics and Patent Office Outcomes, 94 REV. ECON. & 
STAT. 817, 819 (2012); Iain Cockburn et al., Are All Patent Examiners Equal?:  The Impact 
of Examiner Characteristics, 24–25 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Rsch. Working Paper No. 8980, 
2002), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w8980/w8980.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/C8QS-CVLT]. 
 174. Though, efforts to standardize have created challenges for the searching process.  For 
example, the PTO has discouraged examiners from taking “[o]fficial notice unsupported by 
documentary evidence,” which has prevented examiners from making rejections based on 
common sense (which is not always found in the literature). MPEP § 2144.03 (9th ed. Rev. 
10, June 2020); see also Jorge L. Contreras, Common Knowledge and Non-patent Literature 
in the Internet Age, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. ONLINE (Mar. 12, 2016), 
https://btlj.org/2016/03/common-knowledge-and-non-patent-literature-in-the-internet-age-2/ 
[https://perma.cc/B7X3-DS9W]. 
 175. A full set of the examiner’s searches can be found in the prosecution history of each 
application. MPEP § 719.05. 
 176. This occurs in a document called an “Office Action.” MPEP § 2262. 
 177. Id. 
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element of the application’s claim ((1) extruding chlorinated polymers, (2) at 
30 degrees) is present in the prior art.  The applicant can see those reasons, 
review the prior art for herself, and respond to the examiner’s rejection if she 
believes that the match is incorrect.  Conversely, because digging is more 
subjective, examiner decisions about the reliability of evidence would be 
harder to explain and consequently harder to challenge. 
Finally, in certain circumstances, it is appropriate to put the burden of 
digging on the applicant.  In the context of erroneous rejections, the current 
system correctly places the burden of digging on the applicant.  Erroneous 
rejections occur when the examiner rejects an application over prior art, but 
there is some flaw in the prior art such that it does not actually anticipate or 
render obvious the invention.178  In the case of an erroneous rejection, the 
applicant has an opportunity to reply and argue against the rejection by 
presenting evidence to the examiner that the rejection was wrong and should 
be withdrawn.179  Between the examiner and the applicant, the applicant is 
better positioned to uncover flaws in the prior art because the applicant is 
more likely to be an expert in the field.180  Thus, the current system sensibly 
puts the burden of digging on the applicant. 
III.  FURTHER IMPLICATIONS AND REFORM 
Understanding patent examination as a process dedicated to finding, but 
not evaluating, information suggests a new category of examiner errors.  It 
also provides further insight into patent theory and avenues for reform.  Part 
III explores additional implications and presents several specific policy 
recommendations.  Part III.A explains that current methods of fixing errors 
in the patent system will not solve digging errors because, unlike matching 
errors, digging errors are characterized by asymmetric access to information.  
This is followed by proposals for information-forcing mechanisms to remedy 
the asymmetry and fix digging errors.  Part III.B frames prosecution and 
litigation as procedures that do fundamentally different things:  matching 
occurs during prosecution; digging during litigation.  It therefore follows that 
litigation should not wholesale copy doctrines of patentability from 
prosecution—and several doctrines are identified as ripe for change.  Part 
III.C argues that, since patent examination is a series of matching steps, it is 
particularly amenable to automation. 
 
 178. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 179. 37 C.F.R. § 1.111 (2020) (“If the Office action . . . is adverse in any respect, the 
applicant or patent owner . . . must reply and request reconsideration . . . .”). 
 180. The examiner has a general background in the field, but the applicant works in the 
specific field of the invention. See Become a Patent Examiner, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
https://www.uspto.gov/jobs/become-patent-examiner [https://perma.cc/6PL4-MBDX] (last 
visited Mar. 16, 2021) (click “Qualifications” under “I’m interested!  Tell me more . . . ”) 
(“Minimum of a bachelor’s degree in engineering or science.”). 
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A.  Fixing Errors 
Part II argued that erroneous grants of patents due to digging errors are 
common and harmful.  This section explores how these errors can be 
addressed.  At the outset, any type of error—matching or digging—can be 
corrected in litigation, where a court can review the examiner’s grant of the 
patent and can find the patent invalid.181  However, litigation is expensive.  
Further, a challenger trying to prove that a patent is invalid is at an initial 
disadvantage in litigation because granted patents are presumed to be 
valid.182  Downstream researchers may therefore choose to avoid litigation 
and either pay for a license based on an erroneously granted patent or simply 
shift their research to a different area.183  So-called “patent trolls” leverage 
the difficulty of litigation to extract rents from baseless patent claims.184 
Efforts at fixing erroneously granted patents have therefore focused on 
prevention and on quick fixes that avoid the need for lengthy and expensive 
litigation.185  Because there is a large existing scholarship on errors during 
examination, there is also an extensive array of policy proposals to prevent 
or fix such errors, some of which have been enacted by Congress.186  
However, like the existing scholarship on examination errors, existing policy 
proposals relating to fixing those errors are focused predominantly on 
matching errors—examiner failure to find relevant information.187  But there 
is a critical difference between matching errors and digging errors:  matching 
errors are equally visible to both the applicant and to others, such as the 
examiner and the public; digging errors are often not.  Unfortunately, most 
existing mechanisms to address erroneously granted patents require the error 
to be visible to either the examiner or to third parties and therefore, will not 
be as effective at finding or fixing digging errors. 
The following section begins by explaining that, because digging errors—
unlike matching errors—are characterized by information asymmetry, 
existing policy mechanisms will not be effective.  I then propose a new set 
of policies to address the particular problems caused by failure to dig into 
information quality. 
1.  Information Asymmetry 
When an inventor writes a statement in a patent application, such as 
“widgets inhibit the growth of cancer cells,” the applicant knows how much 
and what type of evidence supports that statement.  The public does not, nor 
do patent examiners.  The statement might be backed up by extensive clinical 
 
 181. 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(1). 
 182. Id. § 282(a). 
 183. See, e.g., Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 122, at 48. 
 184. E.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 122, at 3; John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and 
Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2128 (2007). 
 185. See, e.g., Paul R. Gugliuzza, Quick Decisions in Patent Cases, 106 GEO. L.J. 619, 619 
(2018). 
 186. Most notably, the creation of inter partes review proceedings. 35 U.S.C. § 311. 
 187. See infra notes 192–97 and accompanying text. 
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trials and be highly reliable, or it might be entirely speculative and founded 
simply on conjecture.  The applicant does not need to disclose how much or 
what type of evidence supports statements in the patent application, so 
examiners and the public have no easy way to flag statements that are likely 
to be wrong. 
This is well illustrated by the long fraud perpetuated by Theranos.  The 
company claimed that it was able to make diagnoses based on small drops of 
blood.188  The public had no access to the data underlying that claim and was 
therefore unable, at least for a time, to suspect that Theranos’s technology 
did not work.189 
Further, third parties cannot simply test the applicant’s statement, because 
doing so would likely be patent infringement.190  Further, there are a host of 
other practical difficulties involved in investigating the veracity of a claim in 
a patent, including the cost of replication trials, the ability to repeat an 
experiment if very few details are given about experimental conditions, and, 
for life sciences patents, ethical concerns.191  It is therefore often not possible 
for third parties to obtain information about the quality of a statement in a 
patent application. 
While the process of digging into information quality is characterized by 
asymmetrical access to information, the process of matching information is 
equally available to the applicant, the examiner, and the public.  For example, 
if a patent application claims widgets, an examiner will search the prior art 
for information on widgets.  Perhaps the examiner will overlook a piece of 
matching information in the prior art and erroneously grant the patent.  The 
prior art is, by definition, public, so third parties can conduct their own 
searches and find the overlooked information.192  Applicants, examiners, and 
third parties all have access to the same prior art.193 
Current policy mechanisms, built with matching errors in mind, rely on the 
ability of examiners or third parties to find errors.  Because this is possible 
 
 188. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 5. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Using a patented invention is infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 271.  However, some dicta 
suggests that there may be an exception for testing the patented invention. Whittemore v. 
Cutter, 29 F. Cas 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600) (“[I]t could never have been 
the intention of the legislature to punish a man, who constructed [a patented] machine . . . for 
the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects.”).  
This passage is quoted as the origin of the experimental use doctrine, which has been 
essentially eliminated in recent years. See, e.g., Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002); Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 191. For example, if a patentee claims that widgets treat cancer but a third party is skeptical 
that this is true, it is not ethical to run a clinical trial testing whether widgets in fact treat cancer. 
 192. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (listing disclosures that qualify as prior art).  On rare 
occasions, prior art will not be public for a time (specifically patent applications that have not 
yet been published, id. § 102(a)(2)), but these disclosures will become public after a short 
period. Id. § 122(b).  Patent specifications, where examiners search for information relating to 
utility, enablement, and written description, are also public with minor exceptions for national 
security purposes. Id. § 181. 
 193. Matching might be somewhat easier for the applicants, because they are presumably 
familiar with the literature in their fields of study, but third parties can, with time and effort, 
catch up. 
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for matching errors but considerably harder for digging errors, these 
mechanisms may not work in the context of digging errors.  This section 
discusses two popular approaches for addressing errors. 
One widespread proposal for alleviating examination errors is to give 
patent examiners more time to review each application.194  The intuition is 
that many mistakes occur because examiners are rushed; therefore, if 
examiners could devote additional effort to reviewing applications, they 
would make fewer mistakes.  This is likely true for matching errors—the 
universe of prior art is exceedingly large and examiners currently have 
approximately twenty hours to handle all aspects of examination for each 
application.195  Empirical work has shown that increasing the amount of time 
available to examiners reduces the number of errors.196  But increasing the 
amount of time available to examiners will not substantially reduce the 
number of digging errors.197  The problem with digging is not that examiners 
lack time, it is that they lack information.  Thus, this proposed mechanism 
addresses only matching errors. 
A second mechanism to address examiner errors is inter partes review 
(IPR) proceedings.  IPR proceedings allow third parties, even those who 
would not have standing to challenge a patent in court, to petition the PTO to 
review the patent.198  IPR proceedings are required to finish on a timeline 
much shorter than that of a court case and are considerably cheaper, in part 
because they permit only limited discovery.199  The proceedings were 
authorized by Congress as part of the 2011 Leahy-Smith America Invents 
Act200 in recognition of the need for cheaper, faster, and more available 
patent challenges.201  IPR proceedings are designed to catch examiner errors 
and remove those patents without the need for litigation. 
However, IPR proceedings will only fix matching errors.  At present, IPR 
proceedings can only be brought on the grounds that a granted patent is not 
novel or is obvious.202  Granted patents that are in fact not novel or are 
 
 194. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent 
Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents?:  Evidence from Micro-level 
Application Data, 99 REV. ECON. & STAT. 550, 560 (2017); Sean B. Seymore, The 
Presumption of Patentability, 97 MINN. L. REV. 990, 995 (2013); John R. Thomas, Collusion 
and Collective Action in the Patent System:  A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 305, 314. 
 195. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 194, at 550. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Of course, if examiners had unlimited time to review patent applications, they could 
attempt to replicate studies and test the veracity of statements in patent applications.  But the 
time required would be considerable. 
 198. 35 U.S.C. § 311(a). 
 199. COLIN G. SANDERCOCK & TODD R. SAMELMAN, PERKINS COIE LLP, AIPLA 2012 
ANNUAL MEETING:  DISCOVERY PROCEDURES UNDER THE AIA 2 (2012), 
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 201. Stephen Yelderman, Prior Art in Inter Partes Review, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2705, 2706 
(2019). 
 202. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b).  The proceedings are also restricted to prior art patents or printed 
publications. Id. 
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obvious are the result of matching errors where the examiner failed to find 
relevant prior art.  Thus, digging errors cannot be addressed through IPR 
proceedings as they are currently conceived.  However, even if the 
proceedings were reformed to allow challenges on the grounds that the 
patented invention is not useful, enabled, or adequately described (grounds 
that result from digging errors), it would be difficult for the proceedings to 
address these errors effectively because the proceedings rely on the public to 
identify errors and bring a challenge but do not have the same discovery 
mechanisms as litigation.203 
2.  Information-Forcing Mechanisms 
The solution, put broadly, is to imbue the patent system with information-
forcing mechanisms that require or incentivize patentees to provide 
additional information about the quality of evidence supporting statements in 
the patent specification.  This effectively outsources the task of digging into 
information quality from examiners to applicants.  It does not perfectly 
substitute for a process by which examiners independently verify information 
in the patent, but it can approximate some features of that process. 
Information-forcing mechanisms can improve the patent system during 
prosecution or after patent grant.  During prosecution, additional information 
can improve examiners’ ability to dig into the reliability of applicants’ 
statements in the specification.  If provided after patent grant, additional 
information can help third parties identify erroneously granted patents.  The 
sections below set out several potential information-forcing mechanisms, but 
these are not exclusive:  the principle can be applied in many ways. 
a.  During Examination 
A key element of the information-forcing mechanisms set out below is that 
they put the burden on the applicant to provide additional support for 
statements in the prosecution, rather than asking examiners to do further 
digging into the quality of evidence.  This is because examiners are not well 
positioned for this task.  First, applicants have more access to information 
about the reliability of evidence than examiners.  Second, it would be 
enormously expensive and time-consuming204 to ask examiners to assess the 
reliability of statements in applications or prior art, particularly because 
doing so might require building lab facilities and replicating experiments that 
cost many thousands of dollars.  Moreover, examiners do not have the 
expertise.  Examiners have at least a bachelor’s degree in the subject that they 
 
 203. Note that postgrant review does allow arguments about utility, enablement, and 
written description. Id. § 321(b).  However, these proceedings are rarely used. Colleen Chien 
et al., Inter Partes Review and the Design of Post-grant Patent Review, 33 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 817, 827 (2018). 
 204. Examiners are already short on time, which is thought to underlie the large number of 
patents granted despite being obvious or anticipated. E.g., Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 
194, at 551. 
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are examining,205 but this does not mean that an examiner would have the 
ability to conduct replication experiments or even to carefully dig into data 
and results as a peer reviewer would do.206  Finally, the cost-benefit analysis 
is unclear:  the expense of carefully digging into data might be higher than 
the expense of patent errors.207 
Instead of requiring examiners to further dig into the quality of evidence 
in patent applications, the system should ask applicants to provide additional 
support for their statements.  This takes advantage of applicants’ superior 
knowledge.  Examiners would then take the additional evidence and match it 
to statements in the specification.  By using matching to capture some of the 
benefits of digging, these policy reforms fit better with examiners’ expertise 
and capability and are less expensive and time-consuming. 
One approach would require applicants to submit corroborating evidence 
for statements made in the patent specification.  Examiners would then match 
statements in the patent application to the additional evidence.  If statements 
in the application are corroborated by the additional evidence, the statements 
are more likely to be correct.  For example, for each step required to make a 
product, the applicant could submit either documentation from the prior art 
on how that step was conducted or, if the step was novel, lab notebooks 
documenting performance of the step and the outcome.208  Alternatively, the 
examiner could ask for a physical model of the invention and ensure that each 
element claimed by the patent matched an element in the physical model.209  
Where images in the patent are used to corroborate applicant claims, 
examiners should require that applicants furnish new drawings if the 
submitted drawings are unreadable.210  For inventions not physically reduced 
to practice, examiners could ask for extensive documentation explaining why 
each novel step would be expected to work.211 
This would be very roughly akin to the practice of footnoting a law review 
article—the article makes a novel argument but footnotes each step needed 
to support the argument so that the reader can be confident that the novel 
portion of the article is plausible.  Law review editors, like patent examiners, 
cannot fully verify the reliability of each statement in a law review article.  
 
 205. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 180. 
 206. Ronald J. Mann, The Idiosyncrasy of Patent Examiners:  Effects of Experience and 
Attrition, 92 TEX. L. REV. 2149, 2163 (2014). 
 207. See supra Part II.C. 
 208. This would work only for inventions physically reduced to practice. 
 209. Under current PTO practice, examiners only request physical models to prove 
operability for patents on perpetual motion machines (presumably because the applicant would 
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 210. See supra Part III.C.3.a. 
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the invention appear obvious. 
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But they can ensure (via footnotes) that each building block of a novel 
argument matches a prior published statement. 
Once the applicant has supplied such evidence, the examiner could ensure 
that each step in the patent was corroborated by additional evidence.  To be 
sure, these changes would be complex and add additional work for the 
applicant and the examiner.  However, the applicant ought to be in possession 
of much of the corroborating evidence anyway, so disclosing it to the PTO 
might not add a substantial burden for the applicant.  Although there would 
be an additional burden on the examiner, it would be a smaller burden than 
requiring examiners to conduct their own analyses into the reliability of the 
evidence provided by the applicant. 
The PTO could also encourage examiners to take certain actions toward 
digging into information quality.  Examiners could search for third-party 
opinions about a particular technology—essentially the same matching steps 
that are taken in the context of novelty and nonobviousness—but look 
forward from the application date, rather than backwards.  This is not done 
at present because examiners search for evidence that the applicant’s 
invention existed before the application was filed and therefore truncate their 
searches at the date of the patent application.212  However, because 
examiners are examining applications at least a year after the application has 
been filed213 (and often five or ten years later, in the case of patent 
families),214 other scientists will sometimes have commented on a 
technology in a filed application and these comments may make clear to 
examiners that statements in the patent are incorrect.215 
For example, in 2017, Dr. Piero Anversa filed patent applications on 
various inventions involving cardiac stem cells.216  In 2019, an examiner 
searched for prior art, truncating his search at the application’s 2009 priority 
date.217  Had the examiner searched forward from the priority date, he would 
have discovered that Piero Anversa’s research is one of the most notorious 
examples of scientific fraud and that the invention claimed in the patent 
application—cardiac stem cells—apparently does not exist.218  The examiner 
 
 212. More specifically, the priority date. 35 U.S.C. § 120; 37 C.F.R. § 1.78 (2020). 
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did not make a rejection on the grounds that the invention did not work but,219 
had he searched forward from the priority date, he would certainly have 
discovered evidence justifying such a rejection.  Thus, the examiner could 
have used a matching technique (searching for information in documents 
published after the patent’s filing date) to analyze the quality of evidence in 
the patent and avoid an error. 
To avoid undue burden on both applicant and examiner, these policies 
could be targeted to patent applications that are particularly susceptible to 
errors in information quality.  Jorge Contreras has suggested that the PTO 
could keep a list of names appearing on retracted papers, in criminal 
proceedings related to fraud, and involved in securities investigations.220  
Should these individuals be named as inventors on patent applications, the 
PTO could apply more scrutiny.  Contreras further suggests heightened 
scrutiny of technologies in categories that are particularly suspect, which was 
done historically by a now defunct PTO program.221 
The suggestions above of methods to use matching techniques to better 
analyze evidence are merely illustrative.  There are many other possible ways 
to adapt matching for evidentiary analysis.  Cataloguing each is beyond the 
scope of this Article.  Rather, this Article seeks to establish a template for 
examination reform:  digging into evidence is difficult for examiners, but 
some of the goals of such scrutiny can be approximated using information 
provided by applicants—thus taking advantage of applicants’ superior access 
to information. 
b.  Beyond the Examiner 
The goal of encouraging information disclosures can be applied beyond 
the applicant and examiner.  In some circumstances, other parties would be 
both motivated to elicit and capable of eliciting information about the quality 
and veracity of evidence in patent applications. 
First, the duty of disclosure could be leveraged to encourage lawyers, 
assignees, and technology transfer offices (TTO) to evaluate the quality of 
evidence in filed patent applications.  Everyone associated with patent 
filing—inventors, attorneys, assignees, TTOs—owes the PTO duties of 
disclosure, candor, and good faith.222  Attorneys, assignees, and TTOs could 
be a powerful check on applicants tempted to include inaccurate or 
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speculative statements in applications.  For example, one recent Theranos 
patent claiming “[a] method of detecting an analyte in a . . . blood sample 
having a volume of less than about 500 μL”223 (the technology widely 
believed to be fraudulent) was filed by attorneys at a large, very reputable 
intellectual property boutique.224  The lawyers at the firm should have 
knownparticularly by 2018, when the patent was grantedthat statements 
coming from their client, Theranos, were suspect.  The firm should have 
carefully reviewed the contents of the patents and asked for additional 
evidence.  A statement from the PTO emphasizing that the duty of disclosure 
applies in this sort of situation could be an effective incentive for attorneys 
and others involved in the filing process to police information quality. 
Another alternative would be to apply a higher standard of scrutiny to 
patent applications assigned to institutions who had previously failed to 
report known incorrect information to an examiner.  For example, a major 
research university filed a patent application with a diagram that had been 
retracted from a paper on the same topic several years prior (as seen in Figure 
1, below); applying a higher standard of scrutiny to subsequent applications 
from that university would incentivize the institution to carefully review its 
applications to avoid such accidental inclusion. 




 223. U.S. Patent No. 10,156,579 col. 24 (filed Feb. 26, 2016) (issued Dec. 18, 2018). 
 224. See id. at [74]. 
Figure 3(a) (partial)
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The left-hand image is a partial reproduction of figure 3(a) from a paper 
by Zhang et al., retracted in 2016.225  The retraction notice specifically 
retracts figure 3(a), stating that the 
authors wish to note the following:  “It has come to our attention that there 
were significant errors in the data analysis that formed the basis of Figs. 2 
and 3 of this paper, and we are no longer confident in the results presented 
or the conclusions made from the data represented in those figures . . . .”226 
The right-hand image is a reproduction of figure 15A from a patent filed 
by Tufts University (with the inventors listed as Zhang’s coauthors) in 2017, 
which includes the retracted data.227 
In addition, patent doctrine should be clarified to encourage third parties 
to test and replicate statements from the patent—providing an opportunity 
for others to uncover errors.  A patent grant gives the patentee the right to 
exclude others from making and using the patented invention.228  If a third 
party wanted to conduct an experiment to verify whether the information in 
the patent was correct, doing so would be patent infringement, and the 
patentee could seek an injunction or damages.229  Although there is an 
experimental use exception for patent infringement, it is extremely narrow 
and it is not clear whether it would apply in this situation.230  This may 
prevent third parties who want to investigate the veracity of a patent’s 
statements from doing so. 
Further, it impedes scrutiny by patent applicants seeking to overcome an 
examiner’s rejection.  For example, if an examiner rejects an application for 
lack of novelty, the applicant may wish to conduct tests to show that the prior 
art was not enabled and, therefore, not a valid basis for the rejection.231  
However, if the prior art is an in-force patent, the rejected applicant cannot 
conduct such experiments because doing so would be patent infringement.  It 
would be helpful to have a doctrine that clearly stated that using a patented 
technology for purposes of determining whether a statement in the patent was 
correct would not constitute patent infringement. 
B.  Reevaluating the Prosecution-Litigation Interface 
Errors are not the only implication of the matching-digging dichotomy.  
The framework also helps understand differences in prosecution and 
litigation, which in turn dictates certain policy changes.  A key difference 
between prosecution and litigation is that examiners in prosecution do not—
and often cannot—dig into the quality of evidence used to evaluate 
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patentability.  In litigation, both matching and digging occur.232  This 
difference arises because prosecution is an ex parte proceeding with only one 
party (the patent applicant), whereas litigation is an adversarial inter partes 
proceeding with parties on both sides and extensive discovery proceedings.  
The party opposing the patent in litigation has the motivation and resources 
to bring arguments that would not be possible for the patent examiner.233  In 
litigation, parties can and do challenge the veracity of evidence brought by 
the other side.  This section explores how patent theory and policy should be 
reconceptualized and reformed to account for this difference. 
1.  Examination as Quasi-registration 
The PTO examination process is—as the name suggests—considered an 
examination procedure, as opposed to a registration procedure.234  In an 
examination procedure, patents are reviewed in depth by examiners with 
expertise in the field of the invention, an expensive and time consuming 
process that has the advantage of winnowing the pool of submitted 
applications and yielding a high-quality set of granted patents, reducing the 
need for later litigation.235  In a registration process, an administrative office 
ensures all components needed for patentability are present but does not 
inspect the validity of those components at length.  Registration has the 
advantages of being cheap, quick, and easy.236  The public saves money by 
avoiding an expansive PTO staff and applicants save time, money, and effort 
by avoiding extended back-and-forth proceedings with the examiner.  If an 
invalid patent were registered, it could be challenged in litigation.  
Registration shifts the cost of careful analysis from the prosecution stage to 
the litigation stage. 
If patent grant is conceptualized as an event that occurs after an 
examination process, litigation plays a relatively smaller role in governing 
patent quality.  However, the matching-digging dichotomy suggests a 
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lists requirements for patentability that must be examined. Id. §§ 101–103, 112. 
 236. See Merges, supra note 26, at 594–95. 
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different framing:  with respect to many aspects of patent prosecution, our 
current system is a quasi-registration process.  Examiners do not dig into or 
independently assess the veracity of applicants’ statements and therefore, 
take actions more akin to registration.  For example, once an examiner has 
found a statement in the patent that the invention is useful, she simply accepts 
the statement as sufficient to satisfy the utility requirement of 
patentability.237  This is a registration system:  the applicant must fulfill the 
administrative requirement of including a statement of utility; the PTO 
verifies that the statement is present but does not investigate further. 
The import of framing patent grant as a registration event, rather than an 
examination event, is that many aspects of examination traditionally thought 
to be assessed during prosecution are in fact deferred to litigation.  In this 
framing, courts and examiners are doing fundamentally different analyses, so 
courts should not defer to examiner decisions. 
This is different from the status quo.  At present, patents granted by the 
PTO are presumed to be valid and, in litigation, the challenger bears the 
burden of proving that the patent is invalid.238  This assumption makes sense 
under an examination system, because the PTO has already done an up-front 
review.239  It does not make sense under a registration system, where the PTO 
does a cursory assessment but relies on courts for in-depth review. 
Instead of a presumption of validity, there should be a presumption of 
matching.  When a court reviews the validity of a granted patent, the court 
would presume that the examiner matched correctly:  that there are no prior 
art references that anticipate or render obvious the patent in suit; that, for 
enablement and written description, the content in the claims all appears 
somewhere in the specification; and for utility, that the patent contains a 
statement of utility.  However, there would be no presumption that the 
evidence reviewed by the examiner is correct—that is, there would be no 
presumption of digging.  The patentee would therefore bear the burden of 
proving that the statement of utility is correct and that the statements 
supporting the teachings of how to make and use the invention were also 
correct. 
 
 237. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 238. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (“A patent shall be presumed valid.”); see also Impax Lab’ys, 
Inc. v. Aventis Pharms. Inc., 468 F.3d 1366, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he burden of 
establishing invalidity as to any claim of a patent rests upon the party asserting such 
invalidity.”). 
 239. Though the presumption has been criticized. See, e.g., John H. Barton, Reforming the 
Patent System, 287 SCI. 1933, 1934 (2000); F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Preferring Patent-
Validity Litigation over Second-Window Review and Gold-Plated Patents:  When One Size 
Doesn’t Fit All, How Two Could Do the Trick, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1937, 1940 (2009); 
Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 122, at 48; Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the 
Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA L. REV. 127, 159–60 (2008). 
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2.  Embrace Differences in Litigation and Prosecution 
Currently, the standard for patentability is essentially the same in litigation 
and in prosecution.240  However, the matching-digging dichotomy suggests 
that evidence is processed in very different ways during prosecution and 
litigation.  If the PTO process looks more like registration than examination, 
at least with respect to some tasks, having the same standards may not make 
sense.  Although currently many litigation doctrines mimic prosecution 
doctrines,241 this should not be the case. 
This section advocates for a decoupling of prosecution and litigation 
doctrines using the example of two specific doctrines:  constructive reduction 
to practice and use of prophetic examples.  These doctrines have been 
highlighted by scholars as perplexing under current patent theory.  However, 
they are understandable (though not necessarily justifiable) if viewed as 
mechanisms that allow examiners to take what would otherwise be a digging 
task and transform it into a matching task.  The doctrines accomplish this 
goal but in doing so require examiners to take shortcuts in processing 
evidence, which produces some unpleasant side effects and accounts for the 
doctrines’ unpopularity among patent scholars.  Understood this way, these 
doctrines are a concession to the realities of examiner abilities, but they do 
not achieve desirable ends in and of themselves.  Therefore, they should be 
permitted during prosecution but viewed with more skepticism during 
litigation. 
The doctrine of constructive reduction to practice allows patents to be 
granted on inventions that have never been physically created.242  The 
doctrine of prophetic examples allows evidence of patentability to be 
provided in the form of fictional experiments.243  These doctrines are widely 
unpopular with scholars and difficult to rationalize because they appear to 
encourage patents on technologies that do not work and incentivize 
disclosure of inaccurate information.244  Further, scholars have struggled to 
explain the purpose behind the doctrine.245 
 
 240. Although some rules, such as the standard for claim construction, are different.  The 
standard at the PTO is the broadest reasonable interpretation, whereas courts take a narrower 
approach. See, e.g., Jason Rantanen, “Broadest Reasonable Interpretation” and Appellate 
Review 7 (Aug. 3, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2816134 [https://perma.cc/WA7T-RRC6]. 
 241. Some such doctrines are discussed below. See infra notes 242–52 and accompanying 
text. 
 242. See Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 243. Freilich, supra note 134, at 666; Freilich & Larrimore Ouellette, supra note 121, at 
1036. 
 244. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 
HASTINGS L.J. 65, 67–68 (2009); Robin Feldman, Plain Language Patents, 17 TEX. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 289, 292 (2009); Freilich, supra note 134 at 687–92; Timothy R. Holbrook, 
Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 9 (2009); 
Freilich & Larrimore Ouellette, supra note 121, at 1036; Larrimore Ouellette, supra note 121, 
at 1830; Seymore, supra note 239, at 131; see also Mark A. Lemley, Ready for Patenting, 96 
B.U. L. REV 1171, 1178 (2016). 
 245. See 2 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 8:93 (4th ed. 2017) (calling the 
doctrine of constructive reduction to practice “an attempt to provide a theoretical basis for a 
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Viewing these practices through the lens of the matching-digging 
dichotomy suggests that they exist because they permit examiners to search 
for evidence in the specification but do not require examiners to dig into the 
reliability of the evidence. 
When assessing a patent application, examiners must determine whether 
the invention has been reduced to practice.  Because reduction to practice is 
defined as filing a patent application on the claimed invention,246 this is a 
matching analysis.  The examiner need only check whether the invention is 
in fact described in the patent application.  This means looking at the 
invention as defined in the claims and matching it to content in the 
specification.247  Because there is no requirement that an invention be 
physically created, examiners need not check whether the invention actually 
exists, was actually made by the inventor, or actually works, thus allowing 
examiners to avoid an analysis that would involve digging into the reliability 
of the evidence.  Similarly, because applicants are permitted to use prophetic 
examples, examiners need not ask whether data is real or whether the 
experiment works (digging tasks).  Instead, they need only ask whether data 
is present (matching tasks).248  The doctrines can therefore be explained as 
mechanisms to convert what would otherwise be digging tasks into matching 
tasks that better fit the capabilities of patent examiners. 
These doctrines make some sense in the context of prosecution, as they 
avoid requiring examiners to conduct digging tasks that the examiners cannot 
do.  But the standards are the same in litigation:  a patent will be upheld in 
litigation even if it covers technology that was never physically made, and 
prophetic examples are permissible.249  This may be the wrong standard.  
Because courts have the capacity to distinguish between inventions that are 
constructively reduced to practice and inventions that are physically reduced 
to practice, it would be reasonable to implement a standard that allows them 
to do so, such as a working requirement for patents250 or a doctrine requiring 
 
problematic practice of the PTO”); John Duffy, Reviving the Paper Patent Doctrine, 98 
CORNELL L. REV. 1359, 1370 (2013) (“[T]he Patent Office had little or no ability to investigate 
the underlying physical reality of inventions.”). 
 246. See Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 
1986); Bigham v. Godtfredsen, 857 F.2d 1415, 1417 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (explaining that filing a 
patent application constitutes constructive reduction to practice as long as disclosure standards 
are met). 
 247. See supra Part III.A. 
 248. The PTO itself has suggested that this explanation underlies the presence of prophetic 
examples, though without framing the explanation in matching-digging terms:  the PTO 
explained that clarity as to whether test results are “paper” or “working” is essential because 
examiners have “little or no resources to test the veracity of representations made by 
applicants.” MPEP § 608.01(p) (4th ed. Rev. 5, Jan. 1981). 
 249. See Atlas Powder Co. v. EI Du Pont De Nemours, 750 F.2d 1569, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 
1984). 
 250. A working requirement would mandate physical creation (or even use or manufacture) 
of the invention.  Working requirements exist in other jurisdictions and are frequently 
discussed by scholars as a solution to certain problems with the patent system. See, e.g., 
Cotropia, supra note 209, at 1551–53; Mayaan Perel, From Non-practicing Entities (NPES) 
to Non-practiced Patents (NPPS):  A Proposal for a Patent Working Requirement, 83 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 747, 747–48 (2014); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 
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that, by the time of litigation, patentees must be able to substantiate the 
patent’s statement of utility through outside evidence.  It might be difficult 
for paper patents—patents describing products that have never been reduced 
to practice—to satisfy this standard.251  However, that is a feature of the 
proposal, not a bug, because paper patents are precisely the sort that should 
be easier to challenge and harder to defend in court.  Paper patents are more 
likely to be used by patent trolls in abusive litigation.252 
A similar limit could apply to prophetic examples:  they could be used to 
show enablement in prosecution but, by the time of litigation, patentees 
would need to show enablement using real, not fictional, evidence.  Courts 
should not feel bound by the PTO’s rule accepting certain types of evidence 
without scrutiny.  As a general principle, because the PTO and courts 
evaluate evidence in starkly different ways, PTO evidentiary practices will 
often be inappropriate in litigation. 
C.  A Roadmap for Automation 
The matching-digging analysis yields a final mechanism for reform:  
automation and artificial intelligence.  Patent examiners are already stretched 
for time and would struggle to add additional analysis to their review of 
applications.253  Adding additional patent examiners to give them more time 
for review would be costly.  How, then, to improve patent quality without 
excessively increasing cost? 
This Article frames most examiner work as matching tasks.  This has two 
payoffs in the context of automation.  First, computers are particularly good 
at matching-type tasks.  Indeed, software is already involved in helping 
examiners match statements in the patent to statements in prior art through 
the use of search software.254  If artificial intelligence could take over 
examiner matching tasks, human intelligence could be redeployed to more 
complex digging tasks.  Examiner time could therefore be devoted to 
evaluating the evidence that artificial systems produce.  Second, 
understanding examination as a series of matching tasks makes the process 
 
394 (2010); Marketa Trimble, Patent Working Requirements:  Historical and Comparative 
Perspectives, 6 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 483, 483 (2016). 
 251. But not impossible—there may be ample prefiling evidence that the invention was 
useful and adequately described in the specification.  For a discussion of paper patents, see 
UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 664–65 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Smith, J., 
dissenting). 
 252. See Duffy, supra note 245, at 1359 (arguing that courts should revive a doctrine 
“which had authorized courts to discriminate against patents that were never successfully 
practiced by their patentees”). 
 253. See, e.g., Lauren Cohen et al., “Troll” Check?:  A Proposal for Administrative Review 
of Patent Litigation, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1775, 1781 (2017) (explaining that, given the number of 
patent applications filed every year, “one cannot reasonably expect the USPTO to perform 
more than a relatively cursory examination of patents before they issue”). 
 254. Sophisticated search systems, such as those used to find prior art, often involve 
artificial intelligence.  For further discussion of the use of algorithms and machine learning at 
the PTO, see generally Arti K. Rai, Machine Learning at the Patent Office:  Lessons for 
Patents and Administrative Law, 104 IOWA. L. REV. 2617 (2019). 
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of examination more readily adaptable to algorithmic analysis.  The 
conceptualization introduced by this Article may guide the creation of 
examination software. 
CONCLUSION 
There are two steps to assessing evidence:  matching—determining 
whether evidence exists—and digging—determining whether an existing 
piece of evidence should be believed.  Patent examiners assess patentability 
by searching for evidence but not by digging into the reliability of evidence.  
Examiners therefore determine whether evidence relating to patentability 
exists but do not ask whether it is of good quality.  Framing the examination 
process in this way provides insight into why several paradoxical patent 
doctrines exist, predicts widespread errors in the patent system, and guides 
policy solutions. 
Beyond implications for patent scholars, lawyers, and policymakers, the 
matching-digging dichotomy also offers important insights for users of the 
patent system about what a patent actually is.  Scientists, investors, 
journalists, and technology enthusiasts often point to patents as proof that an 
invention works.  After all, the patent has been examined by an expert and 
certified by the government as useful and enabled.255  Unfortunately, patent 
grant does not actually tell us much about whether an invention is useful or 
works.  Viewed in light of the matching-digging dichotomy, patent grant 
demonstrates that the patent has been through a minimal screen and contains 
a threshold amount of information about how the inventor believes the 
invention would work.  Patent grants say very little about the underlying 
technology. 
Conceptualizing the examination process as a series of matching tasks 
allows sharper analysis of patent content, examination procedures, and 
litigation doctrines.  The current practice of restricting examination to 
matching is not a failure but is a feature whose consequences reverberate 
throughout the patent system.  The matching-digging dichotomy is therefore 
an essential tool for efforts to understand and reform the patent system. 
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Its Decade-Long Deception, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 4, 2019), https://arstechnica.com/tech-
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